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This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a com-
mon agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We
show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken
by the downstream principal, (b) the agent’s exogenous private information has a "vertical"
structure in the sense that the sign of the single crossing condition is the same for upstream and
downstream decisions, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then
the upstream principal optimally commits to full privacy, whatever price the downstream prin-
cipal is willing to pay to receive information. On the contrary, when any of the above conditions
is violated, the upstream principal may ﬁnd it strictly optimal to disclose a (noisy) signal of the
agent’s exogenous type and/or the result of his upstream contractual activity, even if she can
not make the downstream principal pay for the information she receives. We also show that
disclosure does not necessarily reduce the equilibrium payoﬀ of the agent and may lead to a
Pareto improvement for the three players.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many contracting environments, multiple principals sequentially interact with the same agent.1
In organizations, for example, a division manager (in the role of an upstream principal) who hires
a worker (agent) typically expects the latter to change employer after a while and pass under the
control of other managers (downstream principals). In politics, the ruling administration (upstream
principal) that signs a procurement contract with a contractor (agent), or that oﬀers a trade
policy to a lobby, expects its counterpart to contract also with the next appointed administration
(downstream principal). Similarly, in commerce, a seller (principal) who sets up a menu of contract
oﬀers, expects her buyers (agents) to procure products and services also from other vendors. In
ﬁnancial contracting, a venture capitalist or an investment bank (upstream principal) who oﬀers a
contract to a start-up (agent) anticipates that the ﬁrm will also contract with other investors, as
well as with suppliers, retailers and, perhaps, regulatory agencies (downstream principals).
In environments characterized by sequential bilateral contracting, a (downstream) principal
who oﬀers a contract to an agent makes the best possible use of any information that derives
from the agent’s upstream contractual experiences. First, the surplus in a downstream relationship
may well depend on upstream decisions. For example, the ability, or the cost, for a worker to
perform a task is likely to depend on the activities the agent performed on behalf of his previous
employers. Similarly, in a trade relationship, the willingness to pay for a certain product or service
usually depends on the complementarity or substitutability with products and services procured
from upstream suppliers. When this is the case, a downstream principal is likely to be interested
in the endogenous information the agent may possess about upstream decisions. Second, the
observation of the result of upstream contractual activities, whenever possible, is also a useful
signal of the agent’s exogenous private information (i.e. information the agent may have acquired
prior to any contractual relationship). For example, the terms of a ﬁnancial contract between a
venture capitalist and an entrepreneur may convey information to downstream investors about the
probability of success of the project as well as the personal characteristics of the entrepreneur,
information that is likely to aﬀect the result of downstream ﬁnancial contracting. Similarly, in a
trade relationship, the history of past purchases of a consumer may reveal information about the
consumer’s preferences and may thus inﬂuence the personalized oﬀers a consumer receives from
downstream vendors.
In a sequential bilateral contracting environment, an upstream principal is thus likely to take
advantage of her Stackelberg position by designing the upstream relationship in such a way that
optimally controls for the inﬂuence it has on downstream contracting. There are two ways a contract
can aﬀect another one: directly, through the decisions that are stipulated (contractual externalities)
and indirectly, through the information that the contract discloses (informational externalities). In
this paper we investigate how a principal should control for both informational and contractual
externalities by designing a mechanism that screens the agent’s exogenous type and strategically
1The distinction between a principal and an agent is often just conventional: in what follows, we will refer to a
principal as the party who oﬀers the contract. We also adopt the convention of using masculine pronouns for the
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discloses exogenous and endogenous information to a downstream principal.
Our ﬁrst result shows that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in
the decisions taken by the downstream principal, (b) the agent’s exogenous private information
has a "vertical" structure in the sense that the sign of the single crossing condition is the same
for upstream and downstream decisions, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are
(additive) separable in the two contractual decisions, then the optimal disclosure policy consists in
keeping all information secret. This is true even if the upstream principal can sell information to
the downstream principal.
Note that when the agent and the downstream principal’s preferences are separable, the optimal
contract in the downstream relationship does not depend on upstream decisions. The only beneﬁts
from inﬂuencing downstream contracting by disclosing information about the agent’s exogenous
type then come from either an information trade eﬀect, i.e. the possibility to make the downstream
principal pay for the information she receives, and/or a rent shifting eﬀect, namely the possibility
for the upstream principal to increase the agent’s rent in the downstream relationship by disclosing
a noisy signal of his type. Both eﬀects may well be positive. To illustrate the rent shifting eﬀect,
consider the following example. Suppose there are two sellers who sequentially contract with a
common buyer. Suppose the buyer has either a low or a high valuation for the downstream product.
If the downstream seller’s prior beliefs assign high probability to the agent’s high valuation (for
example because the proportion of high-valuation buyers is signiﬁcantly high), then the optimal
price in the downstream relationship will be equal to the agent’s high valuation and leave no surplus
to either type. The upstream principal can then adopt a policy which discloses two signals, say
s1 and s2, as function of the agent’s type. Suppose she discloses signal s2 with certainty when
the agent reports he is a low type and with probability δ when he reports he is a high type. If
δ is suﬃciently low, s2 becomes informative of the low type and induces the downstream seller to
reduce her price. Furthermore, when s2 is disclosed with positive probability also when the agent is
ah i g ht y p e—t h a ti sw h e nδ ∈ (0,1) — it gives the latter a strictly positive rent in the downstream
relationship. The rent shifting eﬀect then consists in making the agent pay a higher price for the
increase in his expected utility with the second principal.
However, due to the asymmetry of information between the upstream principal and the agent,
the latter must be provided with incentives to truthfully reveal his type. These incentives, in the
form of an informational rent, are a function of the disclosure policy adopted by the principal.
We show that when the sign of the single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is the
same for upstream and downstream decisions, the increase in the rent the upstream principal
must leave to the agent when she discloses information always oﬀsets both the rent shifting and
the information trade eﬀects. As a consequence, when the upstream principal is not personally
interested in downstream decisions, there is no advantage in disclosing information and the optimal
policy consists in committing to full privacy.
We next investigate in which environments disclosure can be proﬁtable for the upstream prin-
cipal. As a converse to the previous result, we prove that when any of the above three conditions is
relaxed, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal for the upstream principal,
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the information she receives (that is, in the absence of any information trade eﬀect). We examine
separately the determinants for the disclosure of exogenous information and the determinants for
the disclosure of endogenous information. To this aim, we ﬁrst consider environments where the
agent and the downstream principal’s preferences are separable, so that disclosure is uniquely about
the agent’s exogenous type. We show that when the upstream principal is personally interested
in the decisions of the downstream principal, she may well accept to pay the incentive costs of
disclosure if this leads to more favorable outcomes in downstream contracting. We then relax the
assumption of constant sign of the single crossing condition and show that when the decisions of the
two principals are horizontally diﬀerentiated in the agent’s preferences so that a higher valuation
for the upstream decision signals a low valuation for the downstream, disclosing information does
not necessarily increase the rent the upstream principal must leave to the agent; it may actually
help reducing it. Indeed, by increasing the rent in the downstream relationship for those types that
value the upstream decision the least, disclosure creates useful countervailing incentives which help
reducing the payoﬀ diﬀerential across types which in turn allows the upstream principal to extract
more surplus from the agent.
Finally, in the last part of the paper, we relax the separability assumption and consider en-
vironments where the downstream principal is interested in receiving information about upstream
decisions. To isolate disclosure of endogenous information from disclosure of exogenous information,
we assume the agent’s type does not inﬂuence the marginal surplus in the downstream relationship,
so that disclosure is uniquely about upstream decisions and is motivated by the nonseparability of
the agent’s preferences. We show that by introducing suﬃcient uncertainty in upstream contract-
ing (for example through lotteries, mixed strategies, or simply by taking diﬀerent decisions with
diﬀerent types), the upstream principal may create a rent for the agent vis a vis the downstream
principal. However, since lotteries on upstream decisions are costly for they induce ineﬃcient
trade, the optimal mechanism may also require the adoption of a policy that discloses information
about upstream decisions to the downstream principal. We show that the strategy of combining
endogenous uncertainty with disclosure may pay both when the decisions of the two principals are
complements as well as substitutes in the agent’s preferences.
For each environment discussed above, we also examine the eﬀects of disclosure on individual
payoﬀs and on total welfare, deﬁned as the sum of expected utilities. We compare the equilibrium
contracts when the upstream principal is not allowed, or able, to disclose information with the
contracts that are oﬀered in equilibrium when disclosure is possible. We show that, perhaps contrary
to what one might have expected, disclosure need not harm the agent, it may actually increase his
surplus in the two relationships. The eﬀect of disclosure on welfare, is however in general ambiguous.
By reducing the distortions in the downstream relationship that are due to the initial asymmetry
of information, disclosure of exogenous information tends to increase eﬃciency in downstream
contracting. At the same time, it may introduce novel distortions on upstream decisions required
by incentive compatibility, that reduce eﬃciency in the upstream relationship. A similar result holds
for disclosure of endogenous information: in this case, changes in upstream decisions introduced by
the possibility to sustain downstream rents aﬀect not only the surplus in the upstream relationship
but also the value the agent and the downstream principal attach to downstream contracting.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 5
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 relates the paper to
the literature; Section 2 describes the sequential contracting game and illustrates how the optimal
policies can be obtained through a mechanism design approach; Section 3 contains the main theorem
and analyses the possible determinants for information disclosure; Section 4 concludes. Technical
proofs are conﬁned to the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to a few lines of research in contract theory and industrial organization with
asymmetric information.
Information sharing and certiﬁcation. Strategic information sharing among ﬁrms has been
examined in the literature of oligopolistic competition (see, for example Raith, 1998, for a survey)
a n di nt h eﬁnancial intermediation literature (Padilla and Pagano, 1998, and Pagano and Jappelli,
1993, among others). In these papers, the informed ﬁrms can decide to share information with
rivals before competing. Conversely, in our model upstream principals are initially uninformed,
learn information by contracting with the agent, and also create new information by undertaking
decisions that are relevant to downstream principals. Optimal disclosure policies have been analyzed
also by Lizzeri (1999) in a model where certiﬁcation intermediaries possess a technology to test the
quality of the product of a seller and commit on what to disclose to competitive buyers. In this
paper, we assume the only way a principal may learn the agent’s private information is through a
screening mechanism.
Consumers’ privacy. A recent literature on consumers’ privacy considers environments where
sellers have the possibility to use information about individual purchase histories for product cus-
tomization and price discrimination (Acquisti and Varian, 2002, Dodds, 2002, and Taylor, 2003a,b).
Contrary to our paper, this literature however does not endogenize the choice of the disclosure pol-
icy.
Auctions followed by downstream strategic interactions. Informational linkages across
markets have been studied also in the literature on auctions followed by resale or product market
competition. Haile (1999) examines bidders’ incentives to signal information to the secondary mar-
ket in auctions followed by resale. Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf (2002) and Zhong (2002) study the
eﬀect of diﬀerent bid announcement policies on the seller’s expected revenue in auctions followed
by Bertrand and Cournot competition. Calzolari and Pavan (2003) and Zheng (2002) study op-
timal auctions with resale and derive the monopolist’s revenue-maximizing selling procedure and
disclosure policy.
Sequential common agency. Sequential common agency models have been analyzed by Baron
(1985), Bergman and Välimäki (2004), Martimort (1999), and Prat and Rustichini (1998). In these
works, principals sequentially oﬀer their contracts but decisions are taken only after the agent has
received all proposals. On the contrary, in this paper the agent ﬁrst contracts with an upstream
principal, reveals exogenous information, takes a secret payoﬀ relevant decision, and then enters6 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
into a new bilateral relationship with a second principal. This timing is more suitable to examine
the design of optimal disclosure policies from the upstream principal’s viewpoint.
Contracting with externalities. Segal (1999), and Segal and Whinston (2003) provide a general
and unifying framework for contracting with direct multilateral externalities and show how they
can result in ineﬃciencies in the equilibrium contracts. Martimort and Stole (2003) also consider
the role of direct externalities in a simultaneous common agency game. In this paper, we combine
direct externalities with informational externalities and show how they are optimally fashioned
through the design of disclosure policies.
2 The Contracting Environment
2.1 Model Description
Players. A single agent, A, sequentially contracts with two principals, P1 and P2.2 In what follows
we will often ﬁnd it convenient to think of P1 and P2 as two diﬀerentiated sellers.
Allocations and Preferences. Each principal contracts with A over a decision xi ∈ Xi and a
transfer ti ∈ Ti ≡ R from A to Pi. The vector x ≡ (x1,x 2) ∈ X ≡X1 × X2 will denote a proﬁle
of decisions for the two principals. The agent’s preferences are represented by the payoﬀ function
UA = vA(x,θ) − t1 − t2, whereas the two principals’ preferences by Ui = vi(x,θ)+ti, for i =1 ,2.
The variable θ ∈ Θ constitutes the agent’s exogenous private information. We will assume that Xi




.x i =0will denote the "status quo" i.e.
xi =0in the absence of any contract between A and Pi,w h e r e a sxi =1the decision to trade. The
two principals are assumed to share a common prior Pr(θ)=p =1−Pr(θ).T os a v eo nn o t a t i o n ,w e
will let ∆θ ≡ θ − θ > 0, ∆θvi(x,θ) ≡ vi(x,θ) − vi(x,θ), ∆x1vi(x,θ) ≡ vi(1,x 2,θ) − vi(0,x 2,θ),a n d
similarly for ∆x2vi(x,θ) and ∆θ[∆x1vi(x,θ)].F i n a l l y ,w ea s s u m evA(x,θ)=v1(x,θ)=v2(x,θ)=0
for any θ ∈ Θ if x =(0,0).
That Θ and Xi are ﬁnite sets simpliﬁes the description of the stochastic mechanisms oﬀered
by the two principals. That they contain two elements is used only when we solve for the optimal
lotteries. Note that our main result does not depend on the ﬁniteness of Θ and Xi:a sw es h o w
in the Appendix, Theorem 1 extends to environments where θ is continuously distributed over an
interval Θ =[ θ,θ] as well as to X1 = X2 = R+.
Contracts and Privacy Policies. Each principal oﬀers the agent a mechanism (hereafter also
referred to as a contract). A mechanism φ2 ∈ Φ2 for P2 consists of a message space M2 along
with a mapping from M2 onto X2 and T2:f o r m a l l y ,φ2 : M2 7→ X2 × T2. Let x2(m2) ∈ X2,a n d
t2(m2) ∈ T2 denote respectively the decision and the transfer associated with message m2.3 On her
part, P1 oﬀers A a mechanism φ1 ∈ Φ1 that is characterized by a message space M1, a set of signals
2The model can also be read as one in which there is a continuum of agents with independent types, provided there
are no direct externalities among the agents and the principals’ payoﬀs are additive in the trades with the diﬀerent
agents. See, for example, Taylor (2003a).
3Note that in this environment, P2 never gains by oﬀering a stochastic mechanism.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 7
S that P1 will disclose to P2, and a mapping φ1 : M1 7→ ∆(X1 × S) × T1. δ1(m1) ∈ ∆(X1 × S)
and t1(m1) ∈ T1 stand for the joint lottery over X1 × S and the expected transfer associated with
message m1 ∈ M1. With the standard abuse of notation in mechanism design, δ1(x1,s|m1) will
denote the conditional probability of decision x1 and signal s,g i v e nm1. The mechanism φ1 embeds
a disclosure policy d : M1 → 4(S). When the agent chooses message m1,P 1 discloses signal s
to P2 with probability d(s|m1)=
P
x1∈X1 δ1(x1,s|m1). We do not assign any speciﬁc meaning to
the set S, but we assume it is suﬃciently rich to generate any desired system of posterior beliefs
of P2: as we show below, since Θ and X1 are ﬁnite, it will suﬃce to treat S also as a ﬁnite set.
This abstract representation of information transmission between the two contractual relationships
allows to replicate fairly general disclosure policies without imposing a priori restrictions. Note that
the mechanism φ1 is (possibly) stochastic for two reasons: First, P1 may want to create uncertainty
about the decision x1 in order to fashion the contract oﬀered by P2; second, it may be in the
interest of P1 not to reveal to P2 all the information disclosed in the upstream relationship. In
other words, P1 may ﬁnd it optimal to disclose to P2 only a noisy signal of (θ,x1).4 P1 is not
exogenously compelled to release any particular information, so that she can select the disclosure
policy she wants.5
We assume each principal can perfectly commit to her mechanism, which also implies that P1
can credibly commit to the disclosure policy of her choosing. With this assumption we rule out two
possible scenarios. In the ﬁrst, P1 discloses to P2 more information than allowed by the contract φ1.
In the second, P1 announces to P2 a disclosure policy d, but then secretly oﬀers A a side contract
characterized by a diﬀerent policy. As standard in common agency games, we also assume each
principal cannot contract over the decisions of the other principal.
Finally, we denote with τ(φ1) the price P2 pays to observe the signals disclosed by φ1.W e
want τ(φ1) to be the price for information and not for the distribution over X1. To this aim, we
assume τ(φ1) is contracted after φ1 has been executed, so that P1 can not threat P2 to take diﬀerent
decisions in case she does not pay τ. Instead of modelling explicitly a bargaining game between
P1 and P2, for the scope of our analysis, it will suﬃce to deﬁne a set of reasonable rational prices
that can be the result of possible bargaining games. We do it in the following way. Let EU2 (φ1)
be the expected payoﬀ for P2 in the continuation game where she observes the signals s disclosed
by φ1 and EUND
2 (φ1) in the continuation game in which she does not. We deﬁne the set of rational
prices as τ(φ1)=γ[EU2(φ1) − EUND
2 (φ1)] for γ ∈ [0,1]. The parameter γ captures the fraction of
the value P2 attaches to the information disclosed by φ1 that can be appropriated by P1 through
the price τ(φ1). Clearly, τ(φ1)=0for any γ if φ1 does not disclose any information.
Timing: a sequential contracting game
-A tt = 0,Aprivately learns θ.
-A tt = 1,P 1 commits to a public mechanism φ1 ∈ Φ1. If A rejects φ1, the game ends and all
players are left with their reservation payoﬀs that are normalized to zero. If, on the contrary, A
4Because of quasi-linearity, P2 i sn e v e ri n t e r e s t e di nl e a r n i n gt1.
5If P1 were obliged to disclose m1,s h em i g h tﬁnd it optimal to induce A to randomize over M1 (see Bester and
Strausz, 2001, and Laﬀont and Tirole 1990, for dynamic models where a principal lacking of commitment for future
decisions induces the agent to randomize in order to reduce the information revealed in the early contracting stages).8 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
accepts φ1, he chooses a message m1, pays an expected transfer t1(m1), a decision x1 ∈ X1 is taken
with probability δ1(x1|m1)=
P
s∈S δ1(x1,s|m1), and a signal s ∈ S is selected with probability
d(s|m1)=
P
x1∈X1 δ1(x1,s|m1). The realization of the joint lottery δ1(m1) is commonly observed
by A and P1.
-A tt = 2,P 2 pays τ(φ1), receives information s from P1 and oﬀers A her own mechanism φ2 ∈ Φ2.
If A rejects φ2, the game is over. Otherwise, A reports a message m2 which induces a decision
x2(m2) and a transfer t2(m2).
That it is optimal for P1 to make her mechanism public is proved in Pavan and Calzolari
(2003): they show that any outcome of a mixed strategy equilibrium where P1 randomizes over
diﬀerent mechanisms and discloses the realizations of the mixed strategy only to the agent can
be replicated through a stochastic public mechanism which is disclosed also to P2, but whose
realization (the extended type discussed in the next section) remains the agent’s private information.
It is important to note that the fact that φ1 is public implies that P2 can observe the mapping
φ1 : M1 7→ ∆(X1 × S) × T1, but not m1 and x1.
That the game ends after A rejects φ1 is clearly not without loss of generality. However,
note that in a game where A can contract with P2 after rejecting φ1, there exist equilibria where
P1 informs P2 about the agent’s decision to reject φ1, such that all types obtain zero surplus
with P2 out-of-equilibrium. These equilibria also satisfy forward induction reﬁnements such as the
intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Instead of relying on equilibrium selection arguments
to determine A’s outside option with P1, given the focus of the analysis, we prefer to assume it is
exogenously ﬁxed to zero.
Strategies and equilibrium
The game described above is a sequential version of the simultaneous common agency games
with adverse selection examined in Martimort (1992), Martimort and Stole (2002, 2003), and
Stole (1991). A strategy for P1 is simply the choice of a mechanism φ1 ∈ Φ1. For P2, a strategy
φ2(φ1,s) is a mapping from φ1 and s into the set of feasible contracts Φ2.6 The agent’s strategy,
φA =( φ1
A,φ 2
A), speciﬁes the reports to each principal as a function of the agent’s information set, i.e.
m1 = φ1
A(θ,φ1), and m2 = φ2
A(θ,φ1,m 1,x 1,t 1,s,φ 2). Because of their appeal in most applications,
we will limit attention to Markov strategies in which the agent’s behavior with P2 depends only on
the mechanism φ2 and the payoﬀ-relevant component of the history h2 ≡ (θ,φ1,m 1,x 1,t 1,s,φ 2);
i.e. we restrict attention to strategies such that m2 = φ2
A(θ,x1,t 1,φ 2).
As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle φ =( φ1,φ 2,φ A) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium i fa n do n l yi f :e a c hp r i n -
cipal selects a mechanism that is sequentially optimal given the agent’s and the other principal’s
strategies; for each signal s on the equilibrium path, P2 updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule; A
announces only payoﬀ-maximizing messages.
6Although φ2 depends on φ1, the feasibility of the decisions contemplated in φ2 does not depend on the particular
decision x1. This is a restriction. Calzolari and Pavan (2003), for example, consider the design of optimal disclosure
policies for an auctioneer that expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. As resale can take place only if a
buyer received the good in the primary market, the feasibility of an allocation in the secondary market depends on
the decisions taken in the primary market, so that the above assumption is clearly violated in auctions followed by
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2.2 Contracts Design
In games where agents contract with multiple principals, using the (standard version of) the Reve-
lation Principle to construct equilibria is not without loss of generality [Epstein and Peters (1999),
Martimort and Stole (2002), and Peters (2001)]. Among the possible solutions that have been
recently proposed in the literature, here we follow Pavan and Calzolari (2003). They show that
the entire equilibrium set of any common agency game can be characterized by restricting atten-
tion to Markovian direct mechanisms in which the message space Mi = Θ
E
i coincides with the
extended type space and it includes only payoﬀ-relevant variables. In the case competition among
the principals is sequential, preferences are quasi-linear, and the agent follows Markov strategies,
the extended type space reduces to Θ
E
1 ≡ Θ and Θ
E
2 ≡ Θ × X1.
Consider the extended type θE





be the value A attaches to x2 when











≡ v2(x1,x 2,θ). Then for any s ∈ S, we let7
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the corresponding payoﬀ when he announces b θ
E
2 6= θE
2 . Furthermore, let
S (d;φ1) ≡ {s : d(s|θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ}
denote the set of signals in the range of the disclosure policy d induced by the mechanism φ1.F o r
any truthful mechanism φ1 and signal s ∈ S (d;φ1), P2’s posterior beliefs about θE
2 =( θ,x1) will
be denoted by
µ(θE







An optimal mechanism for P2, φ2(s)=( x2(θE
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2 ;s)), then solves the following program
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     
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The individual rationality constraints (IR2) guarantee that A accepts φ2, while the incentive com-
patibility constraints (IC2) that he has the correct incentives to truthfully announce his extended





on φ1.10 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
type. Note that U2
A(θE
2 ;s) is deﬁned as the additional surplus A obtains from contracting with P2;
that is, his total surplus, net of the payoﬀ from the interaction with P1. Also, note that we assume
there is no way A can credibly disclose (x1,t 1) to P2 so that the latter has to give him incentives
for truthful information revelation.
At t =1 ,P 1 designs a mechanism φ1 and a reaction φ2(s) that solve
P1 :

           








































δ1(x1,s|ˆ θ) − t1(ˆ θ), for any θ and b θ ∈ Θ, (IC1)
φ2(s) solves P2(s)( SR)
In addition to standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints for the agent,
the (SR) constraint in P1 guarantees the sequential rationality of P2’s reaction φ2(s).N o t et h a t
treating φ2(s) as a choice variable in P1 amounts to selecting among all possible equilibria the one
which is most favorable to P1. This selection is clearly arbitrary, but consistent with standard
mechanism design analysis: we want to examine the properties of upstream and downstream deci-
sions which maximize P1’s expected payoﬀ under minimal sequential rationality constraints for the
agent [(IR1) and (IC1)] and for the downstream principal [(SR)] – For similar selection arguments
in dynamic contracting with a single principal, see Laﬀont and Tirole (1990).
3 Optimal Disclosure Policies
In this section we characterize the solution to P1 and discuss its implications in terms of disclosure
policies. Before illustrating the properties of the optimal mechanisms, we ﬁnd it useful to introduce
some formal deﬁnitions. We start with the notion of disclosure and of optimal mechanisms which
induce it.
Deﬁnition 1 .
P1’s mechanism discloses information if and only if it assigns positive measure to signals that
lead to diﬀerent posterior beliefs over ΘE
2 : Formally, there exist signals sl ∈ S (d;φ1) and sm ∈
S (d;φ1), with sl 6= sm, such that µ(θE
2 ;sl) 6= µ(θE
2 ;sm) for some θE
2 ∈ ΘE
2 .
Information disclosure is considered optimal for P1 if and only if there exists a mechanism φ1
that discloses information and solves P1, and there are no other solutions to P1 that induce no
disclosure.
Next, we deﬁne the properties of individual preferences that will play a role for disclosure.
Deﬁnition 2 .Privacy in Sequential Contracting 11
Independence. Player i’s preferences are independent of xj if vi(xi,x j,θ)=vi(xi,θ).




Sign of Single Crossing Condition. The single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences
has the same sign for x1 and x2 if a higher (lower) θ indicates a higher (lower) valuation for both
x1 and x2, i.e. sign{∆θ[∆x1vA(x,θ)]} = sign{∆θ[∆x2vA(x,θ)]} for any x1 and x2.
We are now ready to state the main result.
Theorem 1 .
Part (i). Assume the following hold: (a) P1’s preferences are independent of x2,( b )t h es i g n
of the single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is the same for upstream and downstream
decisions, (c) P2 and A’s preferences are separable. Then, no disclosure is optimal for P1 for any
rational price τ(φ1) that P2 is willing to pay to receive information from P1.
Part (ii). When any of the conditions in (i) is violated, there exist preferences for which
disclosure is optimal for P1, even if she does not sell information to P2, that is even if τ(φ1)=0
for any φ1.
Condition (a) implies that P1 is not personally aﬀected by x2 and condition (b) that the agent’s
private information is of a "vertical" form; without loss of generality, we assume the sign of the
single crossing condition is positive in either relationship. When preferences are separable and
Xi = {0,1}, this is equivalent of saying that the values v1
A(1,θ) and v2
A(1,θ) the agent attaches to






does not depend on x1. It follows that under (a)-(c), the only
beneﬁts from inﬂuencing downstream decisions by disclosing information about θ come from (i) a
rent shifting opportunity, namely the possibility to induce P2 to leave A a larger rent and then
appropriate (part of) it through the transfer t1, and/or (ii) an information trade eﬀect, i.e. the
possibility to make P2 pay a price τ(φ1) for the information she receives about θ.
Let W2(x2,θ) ≡ v2
2(x2,θ)+v2




the mechanism P2 oﬀers in case she does not receive information from P1. When preferences in the
downstream relationship are separable, φND
2 does not depend on φ1. As illustrated in the Appendix,
the proof for this result consists in showing that for any individually rational and incentive compat-
ible mechanism φ1 — with reaction φ2(s) — there exists another individually rational and incentive
compatible mechanism φND
1 — with reaction φND
2 — which does not disclose information, it induces
t h es a m ed i s t r i b u t i o no v e rX1,a n ds u c ht h a t 9
EU1(φ1) − EU1(φND





































9To compact notation, we omit the dependence of EU1(φ1) and UA (θ;φ1) on φ2.12 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
Clearly, when γ =0 , the information trade eﬀect is absent, and the only beneﬁtf r o md i s c l o s u r e
must come from the rent shifting eﬀect, which corresponds to the ﬁrst term in (1). Conversely,
when γ =1 , the rent shifting motivation vanishes since any additional dollar P1 can extract from A
for the rent he expects from downstream contracting must be deducted from the price τ(φ1) that
can be charged to P2. In this case, the beneﬁtf r o md i s c l o s u r em u s tc o m ef r o mt h ep o s s i b i l i t yt o
increase eﬃciency in the downstream relationship, as indicated in the second term in (1). Both
the rent shifting and the information trade eﬀects might well be positive. However, disclosure also
aﬀects the rents P1 must leave to the agent in order to induce him to truthfully reveal his type, as















A(1,θ). Among all mechanisms which induce the same distribution
















































When (b) and (c) hold, (2) is positive and thus disclosure increases the expected rent P1 must leave
to A. What is more, this third eﬀect always dominates the ﬁrst two, making information disclosure
undesirable from P1’s viewpoint. To see this, consider ﬁrst γ =0 , so that there is no information
trade eﬀect, and suppose φ1 embeds a privacy policy d(s|θ) which discloses only two signals, s1 and
s2, where signal s1 is more informative of type ¯ θ and s2 of type θ;f o r m a l l y ,l e td(s1|¯ θ)=d(s1|θ)+ε



















This result clearly generalizes to disclosure policies d(s|θ) with more than two signals: The most
proﬁtable signals for A, i.e. the signals that lead to downstream rents for θ, are always disclosed
10That U
2
A(¯ θ;s) increases in µ(θ;s)/µ(θ;s) follows from the fact that x2(θ,s) solves (4), that is x2 =1if
µ(θ;s)W2(1,θ) − µ(θ;s)∆θv
2
A(1,θ) ≥ 0 and x2 =0otherwise.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 13
with a higher probability when A announces θ than ¯ θ. It follows that when γ =0 , the net eﬀect of






A(¯ θ;s)[d(s|θ) − d(s|θ)] ≤ 0.
Next, consider the information trade eﬀect (γ =1 ), i.e. the possibility to increase τ(φ1) by reducing
the distortions in downstream contracting which are due to the asymmetry of information. In any
optimal downstream mechanism, the decisions x2(θ;s) for the high type are never distorted and are
independent of s, whereas the decisions for the low type solve the eﬃciency versus rent extraction
trade oﬀ































2 (θ),θ), the above reduces to
P
s∈S









which is negative since in the absence of disclosure P2 chooses a decision
xND
2 (θ) = arg max
x2∈X2
©




We thus conclude that under (a)-(c), disclosure is never optimal for P1: for any mechanism φ1
that discloses information, there exists another mechanism φND
1 that induces the same distribution
over X1 without disclosure, such that EU1(φND
1 ) ≥ EU1(φ1). This result does not depend on the
discreteness of Θ, X1 and X2. As we show in the Appendix, Theorem 1 extends to environments
where θ is continuously distributed over [θ,θ] and Xi = R+ for i =1 ,2, under the usual addi-
tional assumptions for the continuous case which guarantee that in the canonical single mechanism
designer problem, the optimal policies xi(θ) are deterministic with no bunching.
It is interesting to compare the result in Theorem 1-part (i) with Baron and Besanko (1984).
They consider a dynamic single-principal single-agent relationship and show that when preferences
are additive separable and type is constant over time, the optimal long term contract under full
commitment consists in a sequence of static optimal contracts. Although at a superﬁcial look, the
two results may appear similar, they are substantially diﬀerent. First, in Baron and Besanko, the
principal maximizes the intertemporal payoﬀ v1(·)+v2(·), whereas in our setting P1 maximizes
only v1(·). Second, even if P1 were to maximize the joint surplus, she would not oﬀer the static14 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
optimal contracts. Indeed, this would be the case if the payoﬀ of the downstream principal were
not only separable but also independent of x1, as it is in Baron and Besanko. When instead it
is only separable, as in Theorem 1, the contract that maximizes the two principals’ joint surplus
v1(x1,θ)+v1
2(x1,θ)+v1
2(x2,θ) is diﬀerent than the sequence of independent contracts that are
oﬀered in equilibrium when P1 does not disclose information to P2.11
Finally, note that part (ii) in Theorem 1 provides a converse to part (i): it shows that when
any of the three conditions in (i) is violated, disclosure may be optimal for P1 even in the least
f a v o r a b l ec a s ew h e r eτ(φ1)=0 . This in turn explains the choice on the above conditions as possible
determinants for information disclosure in multiple principals models. The proof follows from the
results in the rest of this section where we relax each condition separately.
3.1 Disclosure of Exogenous Information
In this section we consider environments where the decisions in the downstream relationship are
not sensitive to the allocation determined in the upstream relationship. As a consequence, P2 is
interested in receiving information about x1 only if this is indirectly informative about θ.
Condition 1 The agent’s preferences are separable: vA(x1,x 2,θ)=a(θ)x1 + b(θ)x2, with ∆b ≡
b(θ) − b(θ) > 0; P2’s preferences are independent of x1: v2(x1,x 2,θ)=m2x2.
That the surplus in the downstream relationship depends on θ only through its eﬀect on A’s
preferences and that P2’s payoﬀ is independent of x1 shortens the exposition without any serious
eﬀect on the results.12 To make P2 interested in receiving information about θ, we also assume that
m2 + b(θ) ≥ 0. That is, under complete information, contracting in the downstream relationship
generates positive surplus for any θ.
To save on notation, in what follows we let a ≡ a(θ), a ≡ a(θ), ¯ b ≡ b(θ), and b ≡ b(θ). With
preferences as in Condition 1, the optimal contract φ2(s) assigns the same allocation to the two
extended types θE
2 =( θ,1) and θE
2 =( θ,0).F u r t h e r m o r e , (IR2) binds for θ = θ and (IC2) for
θ = θ. The optimal contract φ2(s) thus consists in a simple take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at a price
t2(s)=
½ ¯ b if
¡¯ b + m2
¢
µ(¯ θ;s) >b+ m2,
b if
¡¯ b + m2
¢
µ(¯ θ;s) ≤ b + m2,
where µ(¯ θ;s)=P r ( ¯ θ|s)=µ((¯ θ,1);s)+µ((¯ θ,0);s). As a result, P1 needs to disclose only two signals,
s1, and s2, such that t2(s1)=b, and t2(s2)=b.13 Hence, signal s1 stands for any information that
11Under assumptions (a)-(c) these contracts correspond to the long run contract that a single principal with payoﬀ
v1(x1,θ)+v
1
2(x2,θ) would oﬀer in Baron and Besanko. Indeed, P1 does not internalize the externality of x1 on x2.
12First note that adding a term q2 (θ)x1 in P2’s preferences does not aﬀect the downstream decisions. Second, as
in standard screening models, letting m2 depend on θ does not add much to the analysis since the virtual surplus for
the P2 − A relationship already depends on θ through its eﬀect on A’s payoﬀ.
13It is immediate to prove that for any mechanism φ1 that discloses more than two signals, there exists another
mechanism φ
0 that discloses at most two signals which is payoﬀ equivalent for all players.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 15
induces P2 to oﬀer a high price ¯ b,w h e r e a ss2 al o wp r i c e ,b. From Bayes rule, this is compatible
with P2’s sequential rationality, if and only if φ1 satisﬁes the following constraints
d(s1|θ) ≥ Hd(s1|θ), (SR1)










.G i v e ns1, trade in the downstream relationship occurs only if θ = θ and
A receives zero surplus, whereas, given s2, trade occurs with both types, and θ enjoys a downstream
informational rent equal to ∆b. When H<1 — equivalently p
¡¯ b + m2
¢
>b+ m2 —t h es e v e r i t y
of the adverse selection problem is such that P2 asks a high price that leaves no surplus to the
agent, if she receives no information from P1. When this is the case, we will say that P2’s prior
beliefs are unfavorable to A. On the contrary, P2’s beliefs are favorable when H ≥ 1. Note that
when beliefs are unfavorable, (SR1) is implied by (SR2) and no disclosure is formally equivalent
to releasing only signal s1, whereas the opposite is true with favorable beliefs in which case no
disclosure corresponds to releasing only signal s2.
3.1.1 Direct Externalities
Suppose now P1 is personally aﬀected by x2; we want to show that when this is the case she
may ﬁnd it optimal to disclose information in order to fashion the decisions that will be taken
in the downstream relationship, even if this comes at the cost of a higher rent for the agent. To
illustrate, we assume the sign of the single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is the same
for upstream and downstream decisions in which case A’s valuations for x1 and x2 are positively
correlated. This guarantees that disclosure is costly for P1 and hence, when optimal, it is necessarily
motivated by the direct externality of x2 on U1.
Condition 2 P1 is personally interested in x2 : v1(x1,x 2,θ)=m1x1 + ex2. The sign of the single
crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is the same for upstream and downstream decisions:
sign(∆a)=sign(∆b).
The externality e can be either positive or negative.14 We also assume that there is always
value from contracting in the upstream relationship, that is m1 + a(θ) ≥ 0 for any θ.
Under Conditions (1) and (2), the surplus A expects from the two contractual relationships
given φ1 is thus
UA(θ)=δ1(1|θ)¯ a + d(s2|θ)∆b − t1(θ),
UA(θ)=δ1(1|θ)a − t1(θ),
As standard, at the optimum constraints (IR1) and (IC1) bind, and thus P1’s optimal contract
maximizes
EU1 = pδ1(1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)
³










14Assuming marginal eﬀects of x2 on x1 is not needed to illustrate the role of externalities on disclosure. A full
ﬂedged analysis with marginal eﬀe c t si sa v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .16 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan









d(s1|θ) ≥ Hd(s1|θ), (SR1)
d(s2|θ) ≤ Hd(s2|θ). (SR2)
Note that since preferences in the the downstream relationship are separable and there are no
marginal externalities of x2 on v1(x1,x 2,θ)+v1
A(x1,θ), the program for the optimal upstream
mechanism can be written by decomposing the joint lottery δ1(x1,s|θ) into a disclosure policy d(s|θ)
and a trade policy δ1(1|θ),w h e r ed(s|θ) and δ1(1|θ) can be treated as independent distributions.
This also implies that δ1(1|θ) can either be read as the probability of trade, or as the level of
trade, with δ1(1|θ) ∈ [0,1]. As we will see in the next section, things are diﬀerent with non
separable preferences, for then the joint distribution over X1 and S clearly matters in determining
the surplus A and P1 expect from downstream contracting. Also note that EU1 is the total joint
surplus of P1 and A, net of the rent UA(θ)=δ1(1|θ)∆a + d(s2|θ)∆b that P1 must leave to θ to
induce truthful information revelation. As for the externality, θ always trades with P2,w h e r e a sθ
trades if and only if signal s2 is disclosed: it follows that the expected externality of x2 on P1 is
equal to pe +( 1− p)d(s2|θ)e.S i n c eEU1 is increasing in d(s2|θ) and since a higher d(s2|θ) relaxes
(IC1), it is always optimal for P1 to maximize d(s2|θ), whose upper bound is given by (SR2) when
beliefs are unfavorable and by (SR1) when they are favorable. Finally, note that constraint (IC1) is
an "adjusted" monotonicity condition which reduces to the standard weak monotonicity condition
δ1(1|θ) ≥ δ1(1|θ) when no information is disclosed. On the contrary, when P1 discloses information,
monotonicity becomes strict for it requires δ1(1|θ) <δ 1(1|θ). It follows that there are two possible




∆b that P1 must
leave to θ, which comes from the fact that the most favorable signal for θ, s2,i ss e n tw i t hah i g h e r
probability when A reports b θ = θ than b θ = θ. The second is the reduction in the upstream level of
trade with θ required by (IC1). However, note that while it is always optimal for P1 to trade with
the high type, trading with the low type is desirable only if m1 +a−p∆a/(1−p) ≥ 0, that is only
if the "virtual surplus" for θ is positive.
We shall now derive the conditions that lead to the optimality of information disclosure. Con-
sider ﬁrst the case where P2’s prior beliefs are unfavorable to A so that SR2 binds and hence the
extra rent that P1 must leave to θ when she discloses information becomes (1 − H)d(s2|θ)∆b. If
m1 + a − p∆a/(1 − p) ≤ 0, P1 never wants to trade with θ and thus a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for disclosure is that
(1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b, (6)
where the left hand side is the marginal externality generated by an increase in d(s2|θ),w h e r e a st h e
right hand side is the marginal increase in the rent for θ. When instead m1+a−p∆a/(1−p) > 0, the
marginal cost of d(s2|θ) also takes into account the reduction in the level of trade with θ imposed by
the (IC1) constraint, which, using SR2 and δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 , reduces to δ1(1|θ) ≤ 1−(1−H)∆b
∆ad(s2|θ).
It follows that in this case disclosure is optimal for P1 i fa n do n l yi f
(1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b +( 1− p)(1 − H)
∆b
∆a
[m1 + a −
p
1 − p
∆a]. (7)Privacy in Sequential Contracting 17
Combining (6) with (7), we conclude that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the optimality of












Things are symmetrically opposite with favorable beliefs, i.e. when P2 is expected to trade with
either type if she learns nothing about θ. In this case, disclosure is optimal only when P1 has
strong incentives to reduce the level of trade in the downstream relationship, which occurs for large
negative externalities.
We summarize these results in the following Proposition [the formal proof in the Appendix also
contains the complete characterization of the optimal contracts for all parameters conﬁgurations].
Proposition 1 Assume preferences are deﬁned by conditions (1) and (2).
When P2’s prior beliefs are unfavorable to A, information disclosure is optimal for P1 for suﬃ-







∆a (1 − H) >
0.
When P2’s prior beliefs are favorable, disclosure is optimal for suﬃciently small negative
externalities, i.e. if and only if e<E≤ 0.
As for the structure of the optimal contract with disclosure, consider ﬁrst the case of unfavorable
beliefs. When ∆b(1 − H)/∆a ≤ 1,P 1 discloses signal s2 with probability one when θ = θ, thus
maximizing the positive eﬀect of the externality. Hence, the optimal disclosure policy is d∗(s2|θ)=1
and d∗(s2|θ)=H<1, whereas the optimal level of trade with θ is δ∗
1(1|θ)=0if m1+a−p∆a/(1−
p) < 0, whilst δ∗
1(1|θ)=1− ∆b(1 − H)/∆a otherwise, where the upper bound on δ1(1|θ) comes
from (IC1). When instead ∆b(1−H)/∆a>1, the rent that P1 must leave to θ when d(s2|θ)=1is
so high that it is impossible to prevent θ from mimicking the high type, as indicated by the (IC1)
constraint: δ1(1|θ) ≤ 1−(1−H) ∆b
∆ad(s2|θ). In this case, to maximize d(s2|θ), P1 never trades with
θ and the optimal disclosure policy is thus d∗(s2|θ)= ∆a
∆b(1−H) < 1 and d∗(s2|θ)= ∆aH
∆b(1−H) < 1.
Note that in either case, P1 never fully informs P2 about θ. Indeed, full disclosure is always costly
(in terms of rent for θ and forgone trade with θ) and is either unnecessary to induce the desired
level of trade in the downstream relationship (when d∗(s2|θ)=1 ) , or incentive incompatible (when
∆b(1 − H)/∆a>1).
Next, consider favorable beliefs (i.e. H>1) and assume large negative externalities. Recall
that in this case disclosure is formally equivalent to releasing signal s1. At the optimum, (SR1)
binds — that is d(s1|θ)=Hd(s1|θ) — (SR2) is implied by (SR1), and (IC1) reduces to δ1(1|θ) ≤
1−(H − 1) ∆b





≥ 1, t om i n i m i z et h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect
of the externality without violating (IC1), P1 must trade only with θ and the optimal disclosure
policy is d∗(s1|θ)= ∆a
(H−1)∆b < 1 and d∗(s1|θ)= ∆aH






the optimal disclosure policy is d∗(s1|θ)=1and d∗(s1|θ)=1 /H, whereas the optimal level of trade
depends on the sign of the "virtual surplus" m1 + a − p∆a/(1 − p). If this is negative, P1 never18 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
trades with θ, whereas if it is positive, then δ∗
1(1|θ)=1− [∆b(H − 1)]/(∆aH) where the upper
bound on δ1(1|θ) is determined by (IC1).
Using the properties of the optimal contracts, we now turn attention to the eﬀects of disclosure
on individual payoﬀs. We compare the three players’ payoﬀs under the optimal contracts described
above with those under the contracts that would be oﬀered in case P1 were not allowed, or able,
to disclose information. Because preferences are separable in the downstream relationship, these
contracts simply consist in a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at price t1 = a if m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0 and at
price t1 = a otherwise.
Corollary 1 Assume preferences are deﬁned by Conditions (1) and (2).
When P2’s prior beliefs are unfavorable to A, disclosure leads to a Pareto-improvement: P1
and A are strictly better oﬀ, whereas P2 is indiﬀerent.
When P2’s prior beliefs are favorable, disclosure makes A worse oﬀ, P1 better oﬀ, and leaves
P2 indiﬀerent. The eﬀect of disclosure on total welfare is positive for large negative externalities
and negative otherwise.
To see why P2 is not aﬀected by disclosure, suppose beliefs are unfavorable. Under any of the
optimal contracts oﬀered by P1, constraint (SR2) always binds, whereas constraint (SR1) is slack.
This means that for s = s1,P 2 strictly prefers to oﬀer the same contract she would oﬀer if she
did not receive any information (t2 = b), whereas for s = s2, she is just indiﬀerent between setting
t2 = b and t2 = b. Furthermore, since P2’s preferences are independent of x1, P2 is not aﬀected by
changes in the distribution over X1 that may be introduced when P1 discloses information. As a
consequence, P2 is just as well oﬀ as in the absence of disclosure. A symmetric argument holds for
favorable beliefs.
Next, consider the eﬀect of disclosure on A and recall that the low type never gets any surplus,
whereas the expected payoﬀ for the high type is U∗
A(θ)=δ∗
1(1|θ)∆a + d∗(s2|θ)∆b. Assume ﬁrst
unfavorable beliefs. If m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0, A clearly beneﬁts from disclosure for he expects




A(θ) depends on whether at the optimum (IC1) binds or not, as indicated above. When it
binds, δ∗
1(1|θ)=0 , d∗(s2|θ)= ∆a
∆b(1−H) and thus U∗
A(θ)= ∆a
(1−H); when it does not, δ∗
1(1|θ)=
1 − ∆b(1 − H)/∆a, d∗(s2|θ)=1 , and U∗
A(θ)=∆a + ∆bH. In either case, U∗
A(θ) > ∆a and hence
A strictly beneﬁts from disclosure.
Things are diﬀerent with favorable beliefs. In this case, P1 induces P2 to set a higher price
(t2 = b instead of t2 = b) with positive probability and reduces the level of trade with the low
type to satisfy (IC1). As a consequence, A always suﬀers from disclosure. The eﬀect on total
welfare then depends on how strong the externality is. For moderate values, the negative eﬀect
on A prevails, and hence welfare decreases with disclosure, whereas the opposite is true for large
(negative) externalities.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 19
3.1.2 Horizontal Diﬀerentiation and Countervailing Incentives
We now turn attention to environments where the agent has horizontally diﬀerentiated preferences
for the decisions of the two principals, that is where his valuations for x1 and x2 are (perfectly)
negatively correlated. We continue to assume that preferences in the downstream relationship are
as in Condition 1, but now let ∆a<0. In this case, A faces countervailing incentives when reporting
his type to P1 : By announcing ¯ θ, A reveals he has a higher valuation for x2, but a lower valuation
for x1.15 When this is the case, P1 may beneﬁt from the possibility to disclose information to P2,
even in the absence of direct externalities. To illustrate, we assume
Condition 3 P1’s preferences are independent of x2: v1(x1,x 2,θ)=m1x1; the single crossing
condition in the agent’s preferences has opposite sign for x1 and x2: sign(∆a)=−sign(∆b).
Under Conditions 1 and 3, P1’s optimal mechanism maximizes
EU1 = p
©
δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a)+d(s2|θ)∆b − UA(θ)
ª
+( 1− p){δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a) − UA(θ)}
subject to the participation constraints UA(θ) ≥ 0,U A(θ) ≥ 0, the incentive compatibility con-
straints
UA(θ) ≥ UA(θ)+d(s2|θ)∆b − δ1(1|θ)|∆a|, (IC1)
UA(θ) ≥ UA(θ) − d(s2|θ)∆b + δ1(1|θ)|∆a|, (IC1)
and P2’s sequential rationality constraints
d(s1|θ) ≥ Hd(s1|θ), (SR1)









. Note that θ continues to obtain ∆b more than θ when P2 receives signal
s2, which, conditional on announcing b θ = θ, occurs with probability d(s2|θ). On the other hand, θ
has now a lower valuation than θ for x1 and thus obtains |∆a| less than the latter from trading with
P1, which occurs with probability δ1(1|θ). It follows that when A’s private information has opposite
eﬀects on his valuations for x1 and x2, it is not possible to determine a priori which (IR1) and
(IC1) constraints bind since this depends on which of the two countervailing incentives dominates.
Nevertheless, at least one (IR1) and one (IC1) constraint must bind in any optimal mechanism
and trade with θ always occurs with probability one, i.e. δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 .
As for the optimal disclosure policy, when P2’s prior beliefs are favorable to A (i.e. H>1) so
that P2 is expected to set t2 = b in the event she receives no information from P1,n od i s c l o s u r e
is always optimal, for having P2 making an oﬀer at a low price increases the value θ attaches
to upstream contracting and may even help reducing the rent for θ. To see this, consider ﬁrst
|∆a| ≥ ∆b, in which case the binding constraints are (IR1) and (IC1) (the formal proof is in the
Appendix). Since EU1 is increasing in d(s2|θ), and since UA(θ) is decreasing in d(s2|θ), at the
15For example, vA(x1,x 2,θ)=( 1− θ)x1 + θx2. See Mezzetti (1997) for an analysis of countervailing incentives in
(simultaneous) common agency games with similar preferences.20 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
optimum necessarily d∗(s2|θ)=d∗(s2|θ)=1 , that is P1 does not disclose any information to P2.
As for the optimal level of trade with θ, δ∗(1|θ)=1if m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0 and δ∗(1|θ)= ∆b
|∆a|
otherwise. In the ﬁrst case, the low type enjoys a rent equal to U∗
A(θ)=|∆a|−∆b, whereas in the
second P1 appropriates all surplus from both types. When instead |∆a| < ∆b, and hence (IR1)
and (IC1) bind, reducing d(s2|θ) m a yh e l pc o n t a i n i n gUA(θ), but comes at the cost of reducing the
probability P2 oﬀers a low price to θ. Since P2’s sequential rationality requires d(s2|θ) ≤ d(s2|θ),
the net eﬀect of a reduction in d(s2|θ) on EU1 is negative so that P1 is again better oﬀ setting
d∗(s2|θ)=d∗(s2|θ)=1 , and leaving a rent to θ equal to U∗
A(θ)=∆b − |∆a|.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c ei n
this case δ(1|θ) has no bite on the rent for UA(θ), at the optimum, δ∗(1|θ)=1 , that is, trade occurs
with both types with probability one.
Consider next the case where P2’s prior beliefs are unfavorable (i.e. H>1). In the absence of
information disclosure, the optimal mechanism simply consists in trading with either type at a low
price t1 = a if m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0 and only with the low type at a high price t1 = a otherwise.







when A reports a low type and with probability d∗(s2|θ)=Hd(s2|θ)
when he reports a high type, P1 can fully appropriate the surplus d∗(s2|θ)∆b that θ expects from
downstream contracting without leaving A any rent. Also note that when ∆b>|∆a|, it never
pays to increase d(s2|θ) above
|∆a|
∆b since above this threshold there are no countervailing incentives
and hence at the margin P1 would also have to increase UA(θ) by ∆b with a negative net eﬀect
of (H − 1)∆b on EU1. On the other hand, disclosure allows P1 to increase the level of trade with
θ to δ∗
1(1|θ)= ∆b
|∆a|d∗(s2|θ) > 0, without increasing the rent for θ.I n c r e a s i n g δ1(1|θ) above this




Things are more complicated when m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, for disclosure may then come at
the expenses of a reduction in the level of trade with θ, which is now costly for P1. Indeed, using
(SR2) and δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 , note that (IC1) and (IC1) require that




Because EU1 is now increasing in δ1(1|θ),f o ra n yd(s2|θ) ≤
|∆a|
(1−H)∆b,i ti sa l w a y so p t i m a lt o
maximize δ1(1|θ) whose upper bound is given by (8). Using (8) and (IC1), we also have that




A(θ)=|∆a| − d(s2|θ)∆b ≥ 0. It follows that for any
d(s2|θ) ≤
|∆a|
∆b , the marginal eﬀect of d(s2|θ) on EU1 is now given by
p
½






where the ﬁrst term combines the marginal increase in the downstream surplus for θ, H∆b, with
the marginal reduction in the upstream surplus due to the contraction in the level of trade withPrivacy in Sequential Contracting 21
θ, whereas the second term is the marginal reduction of the rent for the low type. It follows that
disclosure is optimal for P1 i fa n do n l yi f







Note that raising d(s2|θ) above
|∆a|
∆b never pays since in this case P1 should also increase UA(θ) by
∆b, as indicated in (IC1), without being able to further reduce UA(θ): the net eﬀect of disclosing
signal s2 with probability d(s2|θ) >
|∆a|
∆b is thus equal to p
n
H∆b − (1 − H) ∆b
|∆a|(m1 + a) − ∆b
o







, and d∗(s2|θ)=Hd∗(s2|θ), whereas the optimal level of trade between P1 and θ is
determined by (8).
W es u m m a r i z et h ea b o v er e s u l t si nt h ef o l l o w i n g
Proposition 2 Assume preferences are deﬁned by Conditions (1) and (3). Information disclosure





Contrary to the case of externalities, the motivation for information disclosure examined in
this section is merely the possibility to beneﬁtf r o mt h erent shifting eﬀect. That is, P1 discloses
information to induce P2 to lower her price so that θ can enjoy a positive downstream informational
rent. This policy never pays when A’s valuations for x1 and x2 are positively correlated, for
any increase in downstream surplus is more than compensated by the increase in UA(θ) required
to induce A to truthfully reveal his type. In contrast, when the two decisions are horizontally
diﬀerentiated in the agent’s preferences so that A faces countervailing incentives when reporting
his type to P1, it is possible for the upstream principal to fully appropriate the surplus θ expects
from downstream contracting without leaving θ any informational rent. The only cost associated
with disclosure is then the reduction in the level of trade with θ required by incentive compatibility.
It follows that, when the "virtual" surplus from trading with the high type m1+a−
1−p
p |∆a| is small,
disclosure is always optimal for P1. Note that disclosure is however only partial, since perfectly
informing P2 about the agent’s type would allow the latter to extract all surplus from A and is
therefore never optimal for P1.
Consider next the eﬀect of disclosure on individual payoﬀs and on welfare. Under the optimal
disclosure policy, P2 is indiﬀerent between oﬀering the same price she would oﬀer without infor-
mation from P1 and lowering the price in case she observes s2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,P2 is not personally
interested in the upstream decision so that she is not aﬀected by possible changes in the distribution
over X1. As a consequence, under Conditions (1) and (3), P2 is not aﬀected by disclosure. As for
the agent, when m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| < 0,Aobtains the same payoﬀ as when P1 is not allowed/able
to disclose information, that is U∗
A(θ)=0for any θ. When instead m1+a−
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, disclosure
reduces the rent of the low type from |∆a| to
U∗
A(θ)=−d∗(s2|θ)∆b + δ∗
1(1|θ)|∆a| = |∆a| − d∗(s2|θ)∆b<|∆a|22 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
without aﬀecting that of the high type and therefore makes A strictly worse oﬀ. In terms of total
welfare, when m1+a−
1−p
p |∆a| < 0, disclosure boosts eﬃciency in either relationships by increasing
the level of trade and thus increases welfare. In contrast, when m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, disclosure
increases the level of trade in the downstream relationship, but reduces that in the upstream, with
an e te ﬀect on welfare
∆W = −p[1 − δ∗
1(1|θ)](m1 + a)+( 1− p)(m2 + b)d∗(s2|θ)
which is positive if and only if m1 + a ≤
H|∆a|
1−H , that is if and only if the value of trading between
θ and P1 is suﬃciently small.16 We conclude that
Corollary 2 When preferences are deﬁned by Conditions (1) and (3), the possibility for P1 to








beneﬁts from disclosure, P2 is indiﬀerent, and A is indiﬀerent if m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| < 0 and worse
oﬀ otherwise.
3.2 Disclosure of Endogenous Information
In the rest of the section we consider situations where the agent’s marginal utility in the downstream
relationship depends on upstream decisions, such as in the case of a buyer whose valuation for a
downstream product or service depends on the products and services purchased from upstream
sellers, or a worker whose ability to perform a task in the downstream relationship depends on the
activities done in the past while working for an upstream principal.
To isolate the eﬀects associated with the disclosure of endogenous information — i.e. information
about upstream decisions — from those associated with the disclosure of exogenous information, we
assume the surplus in the downstream relationship depends on x1, but not on θ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
we rule out direct externalities between the two principals, so that disclosure, when optimal, is
motivated uniquely by the non separability of the agent’s preferences for the two decisions.
Condition 4 The agent’s preferences are not separable in x1 and x2: vA(x1,x 2,θ)=a(θ)x1 +
bx2 + gx1x2,w i t h∆a ≡ a
¡¯ θ
¢
− a(θ) ≥ 0. The two principals have preferences vi(x1,x 2,θ)=mixi
for i =1 ,2.
The decisions x1 and x2 are complements if g>0 and substitutes if g<0. To make things
interesting, we assume trade always generates positive surplus in either relationship, that is m1 +
a(θ) ≥ 0 for any θ, m2 + b ≥ 0,a n dm2 + b + g>0.17 With preferences as in Condition 4, the







2 =( x1,θ), for any x1. Furthermore, with complements, (IR2) binds for x1 =0and (IC2) for






17This also guarantees that P2 is indeed interested in receiving information about x1.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 23




b + g if (m2 + b + g)µ(1;s) >m 2 + b,





;s) denotes P2’s posterior beliefs that trade occurred in the
upstream relationship.
Conversely, when x1 and x2 are substitutes, (IR2) binds for x1 =1 , and (IC2) binds for x1 =0 ,




b if (m2 + b)µ(0;s) >m 2 + b + g,
b + g if (m2 + b)µ(0;s) ≤ m2 + b + g,
with µ(0;s)=1− µ(1;s).T h a ti s ,i nt h ec a s eo fc o m p l e m e n t s ,P2 asks a low price if she believes
it is unlikely that A traded with P1, whereas with substitutes if she believes trade occurred with
high probability. It follows that to create the desired informational linkage with the downstream
relationship, P1 needs to disclose only two signals, s1, and s2, such that
t2(s1)=b + gI(g>0), (SR1)
t2(s2)=b + gI(g<0), (SR2)
(10)
where I(g>0) is the indicator function assuming value one if g>0 and zero otherwise. As in the
previous section, signal s1 stands for information that induces P2 to set a high price, whereas signal
s2 a low price. Note that, contrary to the case where disclosure is about exogenous preferences, the
mechanism φ1 is now itself informative about x1. However, to be consistent with Deﬁnition 1, in
what follows we will say that P1 discloses information to P2 only when the optimal mechanism φ1
requires a privacy policy d(s|θ) that assigns positive measure to both signals s1 and s2. Finally, note
that in this simple model, if the two goods are neither complements nor substitutes, i.e. g =0 , the
two contractual relationships are completely unrelated and thus information disclosure is irrelevant.
3.2.1 The complements case
Under Condition 4, A obtains a rent g with P2 only when he trades with P1 in the upstream
relationship and P2 receives signal s2. It follows that the surplus A expects from the two contractual
relationships given φ1 is
UA(θ)=δ1(1,s 1|θ)¯ a + δ1(1,s 2|θ)(¯ a + g) − t1(θ),
UA(θ)=δ1(1,s 1|θ)a + δ1(1,s 2|θ)(a + g) − t1(θ).
At the optimum, constraints (IR1) and (IC1) bind, so that P1’s optimal contract maximizes
EU1 = pδ1(1,s 1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 1|θ)
µ






+pδ1(1,s 2|θ)(m1 +¯ a + g)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)
µ
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subject to the following constraints
δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ) ≥ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ), (IC1)
g[pδ1(1,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 1|θ)] ≥ (m2 + b)
£
pδ1(0,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 1|θ)
¤
, (SR1)
g[pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)] ≤ (m2 + b)
£
pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
. (SR2)
As with exogenous information, EU1 is the joint surplus that P1 and A expect from the two
contractual relationships, net of the rent that P1 must leave to A to induce truthtelling. However,
in contrast with the previous section, since A and P1 share the same information about x1 and the
value A attaches to x2, P1 can appropriate all surplus A expects from downstream contracting. It
follows that with endogenous information, disclosure does not induce the same negative incentives
discussed in Theorem 1. Indeed, the rent A obtains with P1 is uniquely determined by the upstream
level of trade, is independent of the disclosure policy selected by P1,a n di st h es a m ea si nt h e
absence of downstream contracting, i.e. UA(θ)=δ1(1|θ)∆a and UA(θ)=0 . This also implies that
constraint (IC1) is the standard monotonicity condition on the level of trade, and never binds at
the optimum. The remaining constraints, (SR1) and (SR2), are simple rewriting of the sequential
rationality constraints as in (10) using Bayes rule. Note that to maximize the probability P2 oﬀers a
low price when x1 =1 , that is to maximize pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+(1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ), P1 sends signal s2 with
probability one when x1 =0 . Signal s1 is then perfectly informative of the decision to trade and
hence constraint (SR1) never binds and can be neglected. The optimal disclosure policy with the
corresponding downstream price can then be qualitatively represented by the following diagram:
x1 =1 −→ s1 → t2 = b + g
&
x1 =0 −→ s2 → t2 = b
Also note that contrary to the case of exogenous information, the disclosure policy d(s|θ) and the
trade policy δ1(1|θ) can not be treated as independent distributions, for the correlation between x1
and s is exactly what determines the surplus A and P1 expect from downstream contracting.
We now discuss the optimal mechanism φ∗
1 and derive conditions under which P1 strictly
beneﬁts from disclosure. Consider ﬁrst m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ m2 +b.I nt h i sc a s e ,P1 ﬁnds it optimal
to trade with both types with probability one, even if this implies A will not enjoy any rent with P2.
Indeed, from (SR2), the maximal surplus that P1 can appropriate from downstream contracting
is always bounded from above by (m2 + b)Pr(0,s 2),w h e r ePr(0,s 2) is the total probability that
trade does not occur in the upstream relationship.18 It follows that when m1+a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ m2+b,
the "virtual" surplus P1 can generate by trading with either type is higher than the downstream
surplus she can appropriate by not trading and inducing an informational rent in the downstream
relationship and hence the optimal mechanism is δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=1 , which involves no
disclosure.
When instead m2 + b>m 1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, P1 ﬁnds it proﬁtable to sacriﬁce trade with the
low type to give A a positive expected rent in the downstream relationship. The properties of the
18Recall that no trade is always associated with signal s2.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 25
optimal mechanism then depend on P2’s willingness to ask a low price in the event P1 trades only
with the high type. From (SR2), if δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 ,P 2 ﬁnds it optimal to ask t2 = b
i fa n do n l yi fgp ≤ (m2 + b)(1− p), that is if and only if the complementarity is not too large.
Assume this is the case. Then, if m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + g ≤ 0, P1 never trades with θ,f o re v e ni fP2
is expected to ask a low price, the extra rent P1 must leave to θ when she trades with θ more than
compensates for the surplus P1 can extract from the low type. The optimal mechanism is then
simply δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 . When, instead, m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + ˙ g>0, P1 ﬁnds it optimal
to trade also with the low type in case P2 oﬀers him a low price. However, this occurs only if trade
in the upstream relationship is uncertain. Furthermore, since it is always more proﬁtable to trade
with θ than with θ,a tt h eo p t i m u m ,P1 trades with probability one with θ a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=[ ( m2 + b)(1− p) − gp]/[(1 − p)(m2 + b +1 ) ]with θ,w h e r eδ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) guarantees that
P2 is indeed willing to ask a low price. Trade is thus stochastic, but the optimal contract does not
require information disclosure.19
Things are more diﬃcult for P1 when gp > (m2 + b)(1− p),i . e .w h e nP2 is expected to ask
a high price in the event P1 trades with certainty with θ a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yz e r ow i t hθ.I n
this case, P1 has two options. The ﬁrst is to sacriﬁce trade also with θ and guarantee that P2
will ask a low price with certainty. The second is to trade with probability one with the high
type, and use the disclosure policy to induce a low price in the downstream relationship with
probability positive but less than one. When m1 +¯ a ≤ m2 + b, the cost of scarifying trade with
θ is low and hence P1 maximizes the downstream informational rent by setting δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1
and δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=( m2 + b)/[p(m2 + b + g)] = 1 − δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ).20 The optimal mechanism is again
stochastic and it involves no disclosure. When, instead, m1 +¯ a>m 2 + b, t h ec o s to fs c a r i f y i n g
trade with θ is high and hence P1 prefers to induce a downstream rent only by releasing a noisy
signal of the upstream decision to trade. The optimal mechanism is then δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1and
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=( 1− p)(m2 +b)/(gp)=1 − δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ). Note that trade is deterministic, but uncertain
to P2, for it is a function of the agent’s exogenous type.
W es u m m a r i z et h ea b o v er e s u l t si nt h ef o l l o w i n g
Proposition 3 Assume preferences are deﬁned by Condition (4) and x1 and x2 are complements.
Information disclosure is optimal for P1 if and only if (i) m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a<m 2 +b<m 1 +¯ a and
(ii) g>(m2 + b)(1− p)/p.
When preferences are as in Condition (4), P1 trades oﬀ the surplus she can appropriate by
trading with A with the surplus she can appropriate by forgoing trade to induce an informational
rent in the downstream relationship. Under Condition (i) in Proposition (3), the value of trading
with the high type is higher than the value of creating a downstream rent, whereas the opposite is
true for the low type. Hence, at the optimum, P1 trades with certainty with θ a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
19The value for δ
∗
1(1,s 2|θ) comes from (SR2) substituting δ
∗





20Recall that we are considering the case m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<m 2 + b so that at the optimum P1 never trades
with θ,t h a ti sδ
∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 . The value of δ
∗





1(1,s 1|θ) − δ
∗
1(0,s 2|θ).26 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
zero with θ. On the other hand, under Condition (ii), this trade pattern is not suﬃcient to induce
P2 to ask a low price. It thus becomes optimal for P1 to adopt a noisy disclosure policy which
discloses signal s2 with certainty when A does not trade (that is, when θ = θ) and with probability
d∗(s2|θ)=δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) < 1 when he trades (that is, when θ = θ). By choosing δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) suﬃciently
low, P1 then induces P2 to leave θ a rent with positive probability which is in turn fully appropriated
by P1 through the price she charges for upstream contracting.
The reason why disclosure can be optimal when preferences are not separable is that it allows
P1 to exert inﬂuence on downstream contracting without relying exclusively on upstream decisions.
In this simple model, to induce a low downstream price without disclosing information P1 would
need to trade only with the high type with probability less than one. Disclosure allows P1 to
increase the level of trade in the upstream relationship still inducing a low downstream price with
positive probability.
We now turn attention to the eﬀects of disclosure on individual payoﬀsa n dt o t a lw e l f a r e .T o
this aim, consider the contracts that P1 would oﬀer if disclosure were not possible. Under the
conditions in Proposition (3), among all contracts that induce P2 to ask a high price, the optimal
one consists in trading with both types at price t1 = a if m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0, and with the high
type only at price t1 = a otherwise. On the other hand, as we formally prove in the Appendix,
among all contracts that induce P2 to ask a low price, the optimal one is such that P1 trades only
with θ with probability (m2 + b)/[p(m2 + b + g)]. Comparing the payoﬀ for P1 under these two
contracts, we obtain that when m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a>0 and g<∆a(m2 + b)/(m1 + a − m2 − b),
P1 would ﬁnd it optimal to trade with either type with certainty if disclosure were not possible.
Clearly, in this case, disclosure beneﬁts P1 but negatively aﬀects A and P2: by reducing the level
of trade with the low type, P1 decreases the rent for θ and also the surplus P2 can extract from θ.
Furthermore, since it is always eﬃcient to trade in either relationship, disclosure also reduces total
welfare.
In all other cases, disclosure leads to a Pareto improvement since it does not aﬀect the level of
trade with θ — and thus the surplus A obtains from the two relationships — and it either increases
or leaves unchanged the level of trade with θ.A s f o r P2, she clearly beneﬁts from disclosure in
case it boosts trade in the upstream relationship, whereas she is indiﬀerent otherwise. To see this,
note that under the optimal contract with disclosure, P2 is indiﬀerent between asking a low and a
high price when she receives signal s2 and strictly prefers a high price when she observes s1. On
the other hand, if P1 were to trade only with θ without disclosing information, P2 would oﬀer a
high price with certainty. It follows that when disclosure does not aﬀect the marginal distribution
over X1, P2’s expected payoﬀ is the same as without disclosure. Finally, since P1 discloses signal
s2 with probability one when she does not trade with A (that is when A is a low type), she makes
trade occur with certainty in the downstream relationship and hence also increases downstream
eﬃciency.
We conclude that
Corollary 3 When preferences are deﬁned by Condition (4) and x1 and x2 are complements,
the possibility for P1 to disclose information makes P2 and A worse oﬀ and reduces welfare ifPrivacy in Sequential Contracting 27
m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0 and g ≥ ∆a(m2 +b)/(m1 + a − m2 − b). It leads to a Pareto improvement in
all other cases.
3.2.2 The substitutes case
Consider ﬁn a l l ya ne n v i r o n m e n tw h e r ex1 and x2 are substitutes in the agent’s preferences, in
which case A obtains a positive surplus with P2 only if he does not trade with P1,a n dP2,b e l i e v i n g
that trade occurred in the upstream relationship with suﬃciently high probability, asks a low price
t2 = b + g. Substituting UA(θ)=[ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ)]∆a and UA(θ)=0into P1’s payoﬀ,w e
have that the optimal contract maximizes
EU1 = p[δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ)](m1 +¯ a)+pδ1(0,s 2|θ)|g| +
+(1 − p)[δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ)]
µ





+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)|g|
subject to the following constraints
δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ) ≥ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ), (IC1)
|g|
£
pδ1(0,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 1|θ)
¤
≥ (m2 + b + g)
£





pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
≤ (m2 + b + g)
£
pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)
¤
. (SR2)
Note that, conditional on trading, the information P1 discloses to P2 does not have any direct eﬀect
on the surplus A expects from downstream contracting. However, as indicated in (SR2), disclosing
signal s2 with probability one when trade occurs maximizes the possibility of sending signal s2 also
when trade occurs and hence maximizes the informational rent A obtains with P2. It follows that
at the optimum δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=0for any θ, which also implies that constraint (SR1) never binds.
The optimal disclosure policy can then be qualitatively represented by the following diagram:
x1 =1 −→ s2 −→ t2 = b + g<b
%
x1 =0 −→ s1 −→ t2 = b
Also note that since the "virtual" surplus m1+a−p∆a/(1−p) that can be generated by trading
with the low type is lower than that with the high type, m1 +¯ a,i ti sa l w a y sm o r ep r o ﬁtable for P1
to sacriﬁce trade with θ before reducing the level of trade with θ. This also suggests that constraint
(IC1) will not bind and hence it will be neglected.
The optimal contract is then obtained by comparing the "virtual" surplus P1 can appropriate
by trading with either type with that she can obtain by not trading and making P2 oﬀer a low
price. Clearly, when |g| ≤ m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, the rent A obtains with P2 is so small that it never
pays to sacriﬁce trade in the upstream relationship and hence the optimal contract is δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 . On the contrary, when m1+a−
p
1−p∆a<|g|, P1 ﬁnds it optimal to reduce the level of
trade with θ so as to induce P2 to leave him an informational rent. As with complements, the optimal
mechanism then depends on the price P2 is expected to ask in case trade in the upstream relationship28 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
o c c u r si fa n do n l yi fA is a high type. Given this trade policy, when |g|(1 − p) ≤ (m2 + b + g)p,
or equivalently |g| ≤ (m2 + b)p, P2 asks a low price. In this case, the optimal contract for P1 is
δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1and δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1if |g| ≤ m1 +¯ a, that is when the value of the downstream rent
is lower than the surplus of trading with θ. If instead |g| >m 1 +¯ a, then it becomes attractive for





1(1,s 2|θ)=|g|/[(m2 + b)p]=1− δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ).
Next consider (m2 + b)p<|g| ≤ m2 + b,i nw h i c hc a s eP1 needs to trade with positive probability
also with θ if she wants to induce a low price in the downstream relationship.21 Constraint (SR2)
then necessarily binds and hence for m1 + a −
p




1(1,s 2|θ)=[ |g| − p(m2 + b)]/[(1 − p)(m2 + b)] = 1 − δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ).
When, instead, m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0, which is possible only if the "virtual" surplus
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0, the rent P1 must leave to θ in case she trades with θ is so high that it
never pays to trade with the low type, even accounting for the fact that trading increases the
surplus P1 can appropriate from P2. When this is the case, P1 trades only with θ and adopts a
disclosure policy which sends signal s2 with certainty when x1 =1(that is, when θ = θ)a n dw i t h
probability d∗(s2|θ)=p(m2 + b + g)/[(1 − p)|g|] when x1 =0(that is, when θ = θ). As with
complements, information disclosure allows P1 to choose a more proﬁtable trade pattern in the
upstream relationship and at the same time fashion (albeit imperfectly) the result of downstream
contracting.
We summarize the conditions under which disclosure is optimal in this simple model in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume preferences are deﬁned by Condition (4) and x1 and x2 are substitutes.
Information disclosure is optimal for P1 if and only if (i) p(m2 + b) < |g| ≤ m2 + b and (ii)
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0.
That P1 ﬁnds it optimal to disclose information only when the substitutability between the
two goods |g| ≤ m2 + b follows directly from the fact that if |g| >m 2 + b, then P2 never accepts
to trade at a price t2 = b+g and thus disclosure is irrelevant. To understand why P1 then strictly
beneﬁts from the possibility to release information when the other conditions in Proposition 4 hold,
consider the optimal contracts P1 would oﬀer in case information disclosure were not possible.
Among all contracts that induce P2 to set a high price, the one that maximizes P1’s payoﬀ consists
in trading only with θ at price t1 = a and gives an expected payoﬀ equal to p(m1 +¯ a).22 In
21When |g| >m 2 + b, P2 always asks a high price t2 = b, whatever her beliefs about x1.
22Recall that (ii) implies m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 29
contrast, with information disclosure, P1 can sustain the same level of trade in the upstream
relationship, and at the same time induce P2 to leave θ a downstream rent with positive probability.
Disclosure thus trivially improves upon this contract. If instead P1 were to induce a low price in the
downstream relationship without disclosing information, she would have to trade with suﬃciently
high probability also with θ for otherwise, under Condition (i) in Proposition 4, P2 would ask a high
price. Since it is always more proﬁtable to trade with the high type than with the low type, among
all contracts that induce a low price in the downstream relationship, the optimal one is such that
P1 trades with certainty with θ a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yδ(1|θ)=[ |g| − p(m2 + b)]/[(1 − p)(m2 + b)]
with θ, where δ(1|θ) is the minimal level of trade necessary to induce t2 = b + g, as indicated in
(SR2). With respect to this contract, the optimal one with disclosure gives θ a lower rent with
P2, but allows P1 to extract more surplus from θ by limiting the informational rent she must leave
to the latter to induce truthful information revelation. Under Condition (ii),t h i ss e c o n de ﬀect
dominates and hence at the optimum P1 trades only with the high type and uses the disclosure
policy to induce P2 to leave θ a rent with positive probability.
We now turn to the eﬀects of disclosure on individual payoﬀs.
Corollary 4 Assume preferences are deﬁned by Condition (4) and x1 and x2 are substitutes. The




p(m2+b)−|g|.O t h e r w i s e ,A is worse oﬀ, P1 and P2 better oﬀ, and disclosure is welfare increasing
(decreasing) if and only if |g| ≥ (<) m1 + a.




p(m2+b)−|g|, without disclosure, P1 would trade only with the high
type at a price t1 = a which in turn would induce P2 to ask a high price t2 = b.I n t h i s c a s e ,
disclosure is clearly welfare enhancing, for it does not aﬀect the marginal distribution over X1, but
it increases the level of trade in the downstream relationship by reducing the distortions that are
due to the endogenous asymmetry of information between A and P2. What is more, disclosure leads
to a Pareto improvement: A and P2 obtain exactly the same payoﬀ as without disclosure, whereas
P1 is strictly better oﬀ.T h a t A is indiﬀerent follows from the fact that with either contract, P1
trades only with the high type and hence A does not obtain any informational rent. That P2 is
not aﬀected by disclosure follows from the fact that P1 does not change the level of trade in the
upstream relationship and from the fact that the optimal disclosure policy makes P2 just indiﬀerent
between asking a high price with probability one — as in the absence of disclosure — or reducing the
price conditional on s2.




p(m2+b)−|g|, the optimal mechanism without disclosure
is such that P1 trades also with θ with probability [|g| − p(m2 + b)]/[(1 − p)(m2 + b)] and induces
P2 to ask a low price with certainty. In this case, A strictly suﬀers from disclosure since by reducing
the level of trade with θ, P1 also reduces the rent for θ. On the other hand, P2 beneﬁts from the
reduction in the level of trade in the upstream relationship — which in the case of substitutes
reduces the agent’s valuation for x2 — and thus is strictly better oﬀ under disclosure. Finally,
for the eﬀect of disclosure on total welfare, note that disclosure reduces the level of trade in the
upstream relationship, without aﬀecting the level of trade in the downstream relationship. This in30 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
turn is welfare increasing if and only if |g| ≥ m1 + a, i.e. if and only if it is eﬃcient not to trade
with θ in the upstream relationship.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has considered the dynamic interaction between two principals who sequentially contract
with the same agent. The focus of the analysis has been the study of disclosure policies that
optimally control for the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We have
shown that the optimal policy from the viewpoint of an upstream principal who can perfectly
commit to any mechanism of her choosing consists in keeping all information secret when (a) the
upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions of the downstream principal, (b)
the sign of the single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is the same for upstream and
downstream decisions and (c) the marginal surplus in the downstream relationship is independent
of upstream decisions. This result is robust to the possibility for the upstream principal to sell
information to the downstream principal. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated,
there exist preferences for which the upstream principal ﬁnds it strictly optimal to disclose a noisy
signal of the agent’s exogenous type and/or upstream contractual decisions, even if she can not
make the downstream principal pay for the information she receives. We have also shown that the
possibility to disclose information need not necessarily harm the agent and may boost eﬃciency and
lead to a Pareto improvement when it reduces the asymmetry of information in the downstream
relationship and increases trade in the upstream.
In order to highlight the various eﬀects at play, we have examined the determinants for the
disclosure of exogenous and endogenous information separately. Furthermore, the results have been
derived assuming the upstream principal can perfectly commit to whatever policy she chooses. The
design of optimal privacy policies in speciﬁc environments where disclosure may be driven by a
combination of the diﬀerent determinants discussed above represents an interesting line for future
research. Similarly, relaxing the assumption of full commitment may deliver more insights on
the welfare eﬀects of disclosure and on the desirability of regulatory intervention in the adoption
of privacy-protecting policies. Despite the limits of the model, we expect the strategic eﬀects
highlighted in the analysis, as well as the motivations for disclosure discussed in the paper, to play
an important role also in the study of more complex environments.
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5A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1—P a r t( i ) . Under conditions (a) and (c), P1, P2 and A ’s preferences can
be written as















The proof proceeds in four steps.
Step 1.I fP2 and A’s preferences are separable, then without loss of generality the reaction
φ2(s) is independent of x1 so that x2(θE
2 ;s)=x2(e θ
E





2 ;s) for any two
extended types θE
2 =( θ,x1) and e θ
E
2 =( e θ,e x1) such that θ = e θ. Indeed, when this is not true,
there always exists another reaction φ0
2(s) that is payoﬀ-equivalent for all players and which is
independent of x1. It follows that to characterize the optimal mechanism for P1, one can restrict
attention to downstream mechanisms φ2(s)=( x2(θ;s),U2
A(θ;s)). This also implies that when P2




A (θ)). Also note that when W2(1,θ)=0for one of the two types,
information disclosure is irrelevant since P2 always contracts only with one type, whatever her
posterior beliefs about θ. In this case the result trivially holds. In what follows, we thus assume
W2(1,θ) > 0 for any θ. When the sign of the single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is
positive, (IC2) and (IR2) constraints bind so that
U2
A(θ;s)=U2ND










are always satisﬁed, whereas (IC2) reduce to
x2(θ;s) ≥ x2(θ;s),x ND
2 (θ) ≥ xND
2 (θ).
I tf o l l o w st h a ta tt h eo p t i m u m
x2(θ;s)=xND












2 (θ) = argmaxx2∈X2
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which also implies that (IC2) never bind.





, we have that for any individually rational

































































A(θ;s)[d(s|θ) − d(s|θ)] ≥ 0. (IC1)
(14)
Step 3.N o w , l e t φND
1 be another mechanism that does not disclose information, it induces




δ1(1,s|θ) for any θ —















Under (b), the mechanism φND
1 — with associated reaction φND
2 — is also individually rational and
incentive compatible provided that δND
1 (1|θ) ≥ δND
















































Using (12), (14) and (15), (16) reduces to
EU1(φ1) − EU1(φND
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Step 4.T op r o v eEU1(φ1) ≤ EU1(φND
1 ),c o n s i d e rﬁrst the last two terms in (17). From (13),
the diﬀerence between these two terms is never positive. Next, consider the ﬁrst term in (17). From
(13), we have that U2
A(θ;s) is increasing in the posterior odds
µ(θ;s)











then follows from standard Representation Theorems (see, for example, Milgrom, (1981) — Propo-




d(s2|θ) <. . .<
d(sN|θ)
d(sN|θ). It follows that U2
A(θ;s) is increasing in s. The inequality in (18) is
then satisﬁe di fa n do n l yi fd(s|θ)/d(s|θ) is increasing in s, which holds by construction. This also
implies that if (IC1) is satisﬁed in φ1, then δND
1 (1|θ) ≥ δND
1 (1|θ) and hence (IC1) is satisﬁed also
in φND
1 . We can conclude that for any mechanism φ1 that solves P1, there always exists another
mechanism φND
1 that also solves P1 and which does not disclose information. This completes the
proof of part (i) in the theorem. The proof for part (ii) follows from Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Proof of Theorem 1 — Part (i): Continuum of types and decisions.
Assume now θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ,θ], with absolutely continuous log-concave cumulative distribution
function F(θ) with density f(θ) strictly positive over Θ. Furthermore, assume X1 = X2 = R+
and let vi
A (xi,θ), v1 (x1,θ) and v2


































∂θ2∂xi ≤ 0, for i =1 ,2. The above conditions are standard in the continuous case (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Chapter 7) and guarantee that a single mechanism designer would
optimally choose two deterministic policies xi(θ) with no bunching.
Let d(s|θ) denote a probability measure over S and δ1(x1|θ) a probability measure over X1,
with S ⊆ R.
In what follows, we prove the result for the case γ =1 : note that if disclosure is not optimal
when γ =1 , it is also not optimal for any γ<1.
As with discrete types, since P2 and A’s preferences are separable, the reaction φ2(s) is indepen-





will denote the mechanism P2 oﬀers in case she does not receive any information from P1.G i v e n
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It follows that, given any individually rational and incentive compatible upstream mechanism φ1 —

























































A (x2(θ;s),θ) − t2(θ;s).
The optimal mechanism for P1 maximizes (19) subject to individual rationality and incentive com-
patibility constraints for A, as well as sequential rationality constraints for P2,a si nP1 in the main
text. Let the value of this program be denoted by EU1(φ∗
1).
Now suppose P1 could control directly x2 and t2 and could commit to them at t =1 . That
is, suppose P1 could oﬀer A a ﬁctitious mechanism e φ1 =( e δ1(x1|θ), e d(s|θ), e x2(θ;s),U A(θ;e φ1)) such
that A reports his type only at t =1 , and on the basis of the report θ, P1 selects a lottery e δ1(x1|θ),
a disclosure policy e d(s|θ), a downstream decision e x2(θ;s) and a total rent UA(θ;e φ1). Note that
the combination of the disclosure policy e d(s|θ) with the policy e x2(θ;s) induces a lottery over X2.
Hence, think of e φ1 as a stochastic mechanism that for each θ speciﬁes a lottery over X1, a lottery
over X2 and a rent UA(θ;e φ1). Suppose also that P1 wishes to maximize (19) subject to individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Under the assumptions discussed above, it is
well known that the mechanism e φ1 which maximizes (19) is deterministic and is characterized by

















Then clearly EU1(e φ1) ≥ EU1(φ∗
1). In other words, EU1(e φ1) is an upper bound on the payoﬀ for P1.
We want to show that when P1 can control only upstream decisions, she can still guarantee herself
EU1(e φ1) by choosing not to disclose any information to P2 and delegating to her the choice overPrivacy in Sequential Contracting 37
x2(θ) and t2(θ). If this is true, then no disclosure is necessarily optimal. To prove this claim, note






































At the optimum, UA(θ;e φ1)=0 , in which case individual rationality constraints are also satisﬁed.
























subject to (20). Log-concavity of F(θ), along with the assumptions on preferences discussed above,
guarantees that the schedules e x1(θ) and e x2(θ) that maximize (21) point-wise are increasing in θ in
which case (20) is satisﬁed and does not bind.




A (θ)) such that xND













∂z dz. That is, e x2(θ)=xND
2 (θ). It follows that even if
P1 controls only x1(θ), she can always guarantee herself EU1(e φ1) by oﬀering A a deterministic






∂z dz and committing not
to disclose any information to P2.T h i sp r o v e st h er e s u l t .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . In the following, we prove that disclosure is optimal when H<1
(respectively, H ≥ 1) if and only if e>E(respectively, e ≤ E). We do so by deriving the optimal
disclosure policy d(s|θ) and the optimal level of trade δ1(1|θ) for all possible cases.
Recall from the main text that φ∗
1 maximizes
EU1 = pδ1(1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)
³










23We omit the qualiﬁcation almost everywhere henceforth.38 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan









d(s1|θ) ≥ Hd(s1|θ), (SR1)
d(s2|θ) ≤ Hd(s2|θ). (SR2)
First, note that (SR1) and (SR2) cannot be both slack. If this were the case, P1 could reduce d(s1|θ)
and increase d(s2|θ), enhancing her payoﬀ and relaxing (IC1). Second, using d(s1|θ)=1−d(s2|θ),
constraint (SR1) can be rewritten as
d(s2|θ) ≤ Hd(s2|θ)+1− H. (SR1)
When H<1,i f(SR2) is satisﬁed, so is (SR1),w h e r e a sw h e nH ≥ 1, (SR1) implies (SR2).S i n c e
at least one of these two constraints must bind, it follows that for H<1, (SR2) binds and (SR1)
is slack, whereas the opposite is true for H ≥ 1.
Also note that by maximizing δ1(1|θ), P1 maximizes the objective function without violating
any of the constraints. Hence, at the optimum, trade occurs with probability one when θ = θ,i . e .
δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 .






   
   
max p(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)
³





+ pe + d(s2|θ)[(1− p)e − p(1 − H)∆b]
subject to
[1 − δ1(1|θ)]∆a ≥ d(s2|θ)(1− H)∆b. (IC1)
First, assume m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0 so that the optimal level of trade with θ is δ∗
1(1|θ)=0 . If
(1 − p)e<p (1 − H)∆b, the optimal policy is no disclosure, that is d∗(s1|θ)=1for any θ.I f
instead (1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b,t h e nf o r∆b
∆a (1 − H) ≤ 1, it is optimal to set d∗(s2|θ)=1and
d∗(s2|θ)=H,w h e r e a sf o r∆b
∆a (1 − H) > 1, (IC1) is binding and the optimal disclosure policy is
d∗(s2|θ)= ∆a
∆b(1−H) and d∗(s2|θ)= ∆aH
∆b(1−H).
Next, assume m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0. If (1 − p)e<p(1 − H)∆b, then the optimal level of trade
with θ is δ∗
1(1|θ)=1and no disclosure is again optimal. If on the contrary (1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b,
then (IC1) binds, for otherwise P1 could increase her expected payoﬀ by increasing d(s2|θ) and/or
δ1(1|θ). Substituting δ1(1|θ)=1− d(s2|θ) ∆b
∆a (1 − H) into the objective function in P
Unf
1 gives
EU1 = p(m1 +¯ a + e)+( 1− p)
µ









1−p (1 − H)∆b + ∆b
∆a
³




(1 − H)= ∆b
∆a (1 − H)(m1 + a).Privacy in Sequential Contracting 39
Note that E ≥
p
1−p(1 − H)∆b when m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0. Hence, if e ≤ E, then δ∗
1(1|θ)=1and
d∗(s1|θ)=1for any θ. On the contrary, when e>E ,P 1 maximizes d(s2|θ) under the constraint
δ1(1|θ) ≥ 0,i . e . d(s2|θ) ≤ ∆a
∆b(1−H). For ∆a
∆b(1−H) ≥ 1, then d∗(s2|θ)=1 , d∗(s2|θ)=H, and
δ∗
1(1|θ)=1− ∆b
∆a (1 − H). On the contrary, for ∆a




















   
   
max p(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)
³





+ e − d(s1|θ)[(1− p)e − p(1 − H)∆b]
subject to
[1 − δ1(1|θ)]∆a ≥ (H − 1)∆bd(s1|θ)( IC1)
The proof follows the same steps as for unfavorable beliefs.
Assume ﬁrst m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0 so that δ∗
1(1|θ)=0 . When (1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b, the
optimal policy is no disclosure, that is d∗(s1|θ)=0for any θ. On the contrary, if (1 − p)e<
p(1 − H)∆b, then EU1(φ1) is increasing in d(s1|θ) and therefore for ∆aH
∆b(H−1) ≥ 1,d ∗(s1|θ)=1 /H
and d∗(s1|θ)=1(where the upper bound on d∗(s1|θ) comes from SR1) whereas for ∆aH
∆b(H−1) < 1,
(IC1) binds and thus d∗(s1|θ)= ∆a




1−p∆a ≥ 0. If (1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b,t h e nδ∗
1(1|θ)=1and d∗(s1|θ)=0
for any θ. If on the contrary (1 − p)e<p (1 − H)∆b,t h e n(IC1) binds, for otherwise P1 could
increase her expected payoﬀ by increasing d(s1|θ) and / or δ1(1|θ). Substituting for δ1(1|θ) into
the objective function in PFav
1 gives
EU1 = p(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)
µ





+ e − (1 − p)d(s1|θ)(e − E)
Hence, if e>E ,then again δ∗
1(1|θ)=1and d∗(s1|θ)=0for any θ. On the contrary, when e ≤ E
and ∆aH
∆b(H−1) ≥ 1, then d∗(s1|θ)=1 /H, d∗(s1|θ)=1and δ∗
1(1|θ)=1−
∆b(H−1)
∆aH .O nt h ec o n t r a r y ,
for ∆aH




Summarizing, disclosure is optimal when H ≥ 1 i fa n do n l yi fe<E .
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof identiﬁes conditions for the optimality of disclosure and constructs the optimal




δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a)+d(s2|θ)∆b − UA(θ)
ª
+( 1− p){δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a) − UA(θ)}40 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
subject to the constraints
UA(θ) ≥ 0, (IR1)
UA(θ) ≥ 0, (IR1)
UA(θ) ≥ UA(θ)+d(s2|θ)∆b − δ1(1|θ)|∆a|, (IC1)
UA(θ) ≥ UA(θ) − d(s2|θ)∆b + δ1(1|θ)|∆a|, (IC1)
d(s1|θ) ≥ Hd(s1|θ), (SR1)
d(s2|θ) ≤ Hd(s2|θ). (SR2)
First, note that in any optimal contract, δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 , for otherwise P1 could increase δ1(1|θ)
increasing the objective function without violating any of the constraints. Second, note that (SR1)
always binds and (SR2) is slack when H ≥ 1,w h e r e a st h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ew h e nH<1 (the
argument is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 1).
Favorable beliefs. From (SR1), d(s2|θ)=1− H + Hd(s2|θ). Suppose that d(s2|θ) < 1.
Then by reducing d(s1|θ) to zero and increasing UA(θ) by ∆bd(s1|θ),P 1 increases her payoﬀ,
without violating any of the constraints. Hence, d∗(s2|θ)=d∗(s2|θ)=1 , that is no disclosure
is always optimal. When ∆b>|∆a|, the optimal contract is such that U∗
A(θ)=∆b − |∆a|,
U∗
A(θ)=0 , and δ∗







p |∆a| < 0; if on the contrary m1+a−
1−p





Unfavorable beliefs. F i r s t ,o b s e r v et h a ta tt h eo p t i m u m(IC1) must be saturated. Indeed,
if this were not true, then necessarily UA(θ)=0and δ1(1|θ)=1 , for otherwise P1 could reduce
UA(θ) and/or increase δ1(1|θ) enhancing her payoﬀ. But then from (IC1) and (IC1), 0 ≥ UA(θ)−
d(s2|θ)∆b + |∆a| ≥ [d(s2|θ) − d(s2|θ)]∆b, which is consistent with d(s2|θ) ≥ d(s2|θ) only if no
information is disclosed — that is d(s2|θ)=d(s2|θ) —a n dUA(θ) − d(s2|θ)∆b + |∆a| =0 ,i nw h i c h
case (IC1) is saturated. Next, we establish that U∗
A(θ)=0 . Again, suppose this is not true. Then,
necessarily UA(θ)=0 , for otherwise P1 could reduce both rents by the same amount. Using the
result that (IC1) necessarily binds, we have that UA(θ)=d(s2|θ)∆b − δ1(1|θ)|∆a|. Replacing





+( 1− p){m1 + a}
which is increasing in δ1(1|θ). But then δ1(1|θ)=m i n
n
d(s2|θ)H ∆b




where the upper bound comes from (IR1) and (IC1), substituting UA(θ) and UA(θ) and using
(SR2),t h a ti sd(s2|θ)=Hd(s2|θ). If ∆b ≤ |∆a|, min
n
d(s2|θ)H ∆b





|∆a| for all d(s2|θ) and thus δ1(1|θ)=d(s2|θ)H ∆b
|∆a|, which implies that UA(θ)=0 . If
instead ∆b>|∆a|, then δ1(1|θ) is maximized at d(s2|θ)=
|∆a|
∆b , and again UA(θ)=0 . SubstitutingPrivacy in Sequential Contracting 41





    
    
max
φ1∈Φ1
pδ1(1|θ)(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|)+( 1− p)(m1 + a)+d(s2|θ)H∆b
subject to
δ1(1|θ) ≥ d(s2|θ)H ∆b
|∆a|, (IR1)
δ1(1|θ) ≤ 1 − d(s2|θ) ∆b
|∆a|(1 − H). (IC1)
If m1+a−
1−p
p |∆a| < 0, (IR1) binds. Replacing δ∗
1(1|θ)=d(s2|θ)H ∆b













+( 1− p)(m1 + a),






, where the upper








1(1|θ)=1 , and δ∗
1(1|θ)=H ∆b
|∆a|d∗(s2|θ) is optimal.
If on the contrary, m1 + a −
1−p









































1(1|θ)=1− (1 − H) ∆b
|∆a|d∗(s2|θ).













Proof of Proposition 3.
The optimal mechanism φ∗
1 maximizes
EU1 = pδ1(1,s 1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 1|θ)
µ






+pδ1(1,s 2|θ)(m1 +¯ a + g)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)
µ






δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ) ≥ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ), (IC1)
g[pδ1(1,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 1|θ)] ≥ (m2 + b)
£
pδ1(0,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 1|θ)
¤
, (SR1)
g[pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)] ≤ (m2 + b)
£
pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
. (SR2)42 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
At the optimum, (SR1) never binds and thus can be neglected. Indeed, δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ)=0for any θ is
always optimal, for reducing δ1(0,s 1|θ) and increasing δ1(0,s 2|θ) relaxes (SR1) and (SR2) without
aﬀecting EU1.C o n s t r a i n t(IC1) can also be ignored as it is always satisﬁed at the optimum.
Next, observe that the maximal expected surplus that P1 can appropriate from P2 by reducing
the level of trade in the upstream relationship and disclosing signal s2 instead of s1 is bounded
from above by the right hand side in (SR2). On the other hand, the cost of creating a downstream
rent is the surplus that P1 must forgo in the upstream relationship when she does not trade. It
follows that when m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ m2 + b,
pδ1(0,s 2|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
µ







pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
(m2 + b)
>g [pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)]
and hence δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=1for any θ is always optimal. On the contrary, when m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<
m2 + b, then necessarily δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=0 , for otherwise P1 could transfer an ε probability from
δ1(1,s 1|θ) to δ1(0,s 2|θ) and then increase δ1(1,s 2|θ) by
ε(m2+b)
g and reduce δ1(1,s 1|θ) by the same
amount, enhancing her payoﬀ, without violating (SR2).
Suppose ﬁrst −g ≤ m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≤ m2 + b, in which case (SR2) always binds, for the
unconstrained solution is δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 . Note that, if δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) < 1, then necessarily
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 , since otherwise P1 could transfer an ε probability from δ1(0,s 2|θ) to δ1(1,s 2|θ) and
a
p
1−pε probability from δ1(1,s 2|θ) to δ1(0,s 2|θ), increasing EU1 and preserving (SR2). This also




(1 − p)(m2 + b) − pg
(1 − p)[m2 + b + g]
=1− δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ),
whereas for pg > (1 − p)(m2 + b), necessarily δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1and δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) < 1.T h e o p t i m a l
mechanism in this case depends on the comparison between m1+¯ a and m2+b. If m1+¯ a>m 2+b,
then δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=0 . To see this, note that by reducing δ1(0,s 2|θ) and δ1(1,s 2|θ), respectively by
ε and
ε(m2+b)





,P 1 enhances EU1, without violating
(SR2). It follows that for m1 +¯ a>m 2 + b,
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=




where the upper bound on δ∗






p[m2 + b + g]
=1− δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ).Privacy in Sequential Contracting 43
Finally, consider m1+a−
p
1−p∆a ≤− g. In this case, δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1is always optimal. Following
the same steps as in the previous case, when pg ≤ (1 − p)(m2 + b), then δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 ,w h e r e a s










From the above results, we conclude that disclosure is optimal if and only if (i) m1+a−
p
1−p∆a<
m2 + b<m 1 +¯ a, and (ii) pg > (1 − p)(m2 + b).
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 . The proof derives the optimal contract P1 would oﬀer under Condi-
tions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3, were she unable or prohibited to disclose information to P2. The
analysis of the eﬀects of disclosure on welfare is in the main text.
Among all contracts that induce P2 to set a high price t2 = b+g, the maximal payoﬀ for P1 is
clearly achieved by trading with both types at price t1 = a if m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0, a n dw i t ht h e
high type only at price t1 = a otherwise. In contrast, the optimal contract that induces P2 to ask




   
   
max pδ1(1|θ)(m1 +¯ a + g)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)
³
















+( 1− p)(1− δ1(1|θ))
¤
, (SR2)
where constraint (SR2) guarantees that t2 = b is indeed sequentially rational for P2. Under Con-
dition (ii), that is for pg > (1 − p)(m2 + b), constraint (SR2) always binds, whatever the sign of
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + g. Using (SR2), we have that E[U1] is maximized at δ1(1|θ)= m2+b
p(m2+b+g) and
δ1(1|θ)=0and yields EU1 =
p(m2+b)(m1+¯ a+g)
p(m2+b+g) . The optimal contract is obtained by comparing





m2+b+g ≥ p(m1+¯ a) i fa n do n l yi fg ≤ ∆a(m2+b)/[m1 + a − m2 − b],




m2+b+g ≥ m1 +a if and only if g ≤
(1−p)(m2+b)(m1+a)
p(m1+a)−m2−b .
Proof of Proposition 4.
The optimal contract maximizes
EU1 = p[δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ)](m1 +¯ a)+pδ1(0,s 2|θ)|g|
(1 − p)[δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ)]
µ






+(1 − p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)|g|
subject to
δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ) ≥ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ), (IC1)
|g|
£
pδ1(0,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 1|θ)
¤
≥ (m2 + b + g)
£





pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
≤ (m2 + b + g)
£
pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)
¤
. (SR2)44 G. Calzolari and A. Pavan
At the optimum, δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=0for any θ. Indeed, by reducing δ1(1,s 1|θ) and increasing δ1(1,s 2|θ),
P1 relaxes (SR1) and (SR2) with no eﬀect on (IC1) and the objective function. It follows that
constraint (SR1) can be neglected. Constraint (IC1) will also be ignored as it never binds at the
optimum. Also, in all cases, δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ)=0 , for otherwise P1 could reduce δ1(0,s 1|θ) and increase
δ1(1,s 2|θ) relaxing (SR2) and (IC1) and enhancing EU1.
If |g| ≤ m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, the solution is simply δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 .
If, instead, m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≤ |g| ≤ m1 +¯ a, then the unconstrained solution is δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=
δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 ,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes (SR2) i fa n do n l yi f|g|(1 − p) ≤ (m2 + b + g)p, or equivalently
|g| ≤ p(m2 + b). If on the contrary p(m2 + b) < |g| ≤ (m2 + b), then constraint (SR2) binds and
hence δ1(0,s 2|θ) < 1. The optimal mechanism then depends on the sign of m1+a−
p
1−p∆a+m2+b+g.
Suppose it is positive; then δ∗






1(1,s 2|θ) are determined directly from (SR2). Indeed, by reducing δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ) by (1+
m2+b+g
|g| )ε
and increasing δ1(1,s 2|θ) and δ1(0,s 2|θ), respectively by ε and
m2+b+g
|g| ε, P1 increases EU1 preserving
(SR2). By a similar argument, if m1+a−
p
1−p∆a+m2+b+g<0, then necessarily δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=0 ,
in which case δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=
p(m2+b+g)
(1−p)|g| is determined from (SR2) and δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ)=1− δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ).
Finally, if |g| >m 1+¯ a, then (SR2) always binds, for the unconstrained solution is δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=
δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 . Note that if δ1(0,s 2|θ) > 0, then necessarily δ1(0,s 2|θ)=1 . Otherwise, P1 could
transfer an ε probability from δ1(0,s 2|θ) to δ1(1,s 2|θ) and
p
1−pε probability from either δ1(1,s 2|θ) or
δ1(0,s 1|θ) to δ1(0,s 2|θ) increasing EU1 without violating (SR2). It follows that for |g| ≤ p(m2+b),




1(1,s 2|θ)=|g|/[(m2 + b)p]=1− δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ),
whereas for |g| >p (m2 + b), necessarily δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 , in which case the solution coincides with
that for the case m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≤ |g| ≤ m1 +¯ a.
We conclude that disclosure is optimal if and only if (i) p(m2 + b) < |g| ≤ m2 + b and (ii)
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y4 . In what follows, we construct the optimal contract for P1 under
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4, in case P1 is unable or prohibited to disclose information
to P2. The analysis of the eﬀects of disclosure on welfare and individual payoﬀs is in the main text.
Note that under Condition (ii), m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0, which in turn implies that among all
contracts that induces a high downstream price the optimal one is δ1(1|θ)=1and δ1(0|θ)=1 .I n
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where (SR2) necessarily binds at the solution. Using the two feasibility constraints δ1(0|θ)=
1 − δ1(1|θ) and δ1(0|θ)=1− δ1(1|θ), constraint (SR2) reduces to
δ1(1|θ)=
|g|





Constraint (IC1) then requires that δ1(1|θ) ≥
|g|
m2+b and the objective function is increasing in
δ1(1|θ). Hence, the solution to PND
1 is δ1(1|θ)=1and δ1(1|θ)=
|g|−p(m2+b)
(1−p)(m2+b).
Comparing the payoﬀ for P1 under the above two contracts, we have that the optimal mecha-
nism in case P1 does not disclose information induces a low price if and only if
|g| − p(m2 + b)
(1 − p)(m2 + b)
µ








|g| − p(m2 + b)
(1 − p)(m2 + b)
¸
≤ 0
or equivalently m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≤
|g|(m2+b+g)
p(m2+b)−|g|.